INFORMATION DISCLOSURE AND
THE UNION REPRESENTATION ELECTION
Matthew T. Bodie
In its oversight of union representation elections, the National Labor Relations
Board seeks to create “laboratory conditions” to determine “the uninhibited
desires” of employees. Despite the Board’s intrusive regulation of union and
employer campaign conduct, the Board does nothing to insure that employees
get basic information relating to their decision. Given the flaws in the market
for union representation, particularly with respect to conflicts of interest, the
Board should take a more aggressive role in ensuring that employees get the
information they need to make rational representation decisions. This Article
proposes a new system of mandatory disclosure, modeled on disclosure regimes
such as in federal securities regulation, in order to ferret out fraud, provide
employees with critical information, and restore worker confidence in unions.
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INTRODUCTION
Last year, for the first time in almost half a century, the percentage of
private sector unionization did not decline.1 This was big news. Since
1

See U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, News Release, Union
Membership in 2005, January 20, 2006, available at:
http://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/union2.pdf [hereinafter BLS News Release]
(noting that the rate of private sector unionization had declined every year from 1983
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the 1950s the percentage of private sector employees who are union
members has been steadily and seemingly inexorably falling. At its peak,
union members represented more than a third of the workforce.2 By
1983, only a fifth were unionized; now, less than thirteen percent are
union members.3 Only 7.8 percent of private sector employees are in a
union.4
The pressure of continued losses has driven union leadership to make
organizing their top priority. In 1995, the AFL-CIO elected John
Sweeney on a platform of increased outreach and renewed organizing
efforts.5 His tenure has been marked by a greater attention and resources
devoted to organizing efforts.6 Despite these efforts, union membership
continued to decline. By 2005, there was sufficient disenchantment with
Sweeney’s efforts that several of the biggest unions in America, including
the Service Employees International Union and the Teamsters, left the
AFL-CIO and formed a new coalition.7
Labor’s organizing failures have also confounded labor law scholars.8
Given that the labor laws were enacted to give workers an advantage in
negotiating with employers, it seems puzzling that workers are less and
less interested in taking advantage of those laws. Even critics of the labor
law regime concede that employees have strong economic incentives for
exploiting the potential monopoly power that unionization provides.9 The
until this year). For statistics prior to 1983, see LEO TROY & NEIL SHEFLIN, UNION
SOURCEBOOK: MEMBERSHIP, STRUCTURE & FINANCE DIRECTORY app. A at A-1 (1985).
2
MICHAEL GOLDFIELD, THE DECLINE OF ORGANIZED LABOR IN THE UNITED STATES 10
(1987); TROY & SHEFLIN, supra note 1, at A-1.
3
BLS News Release, supra note 1.
4
Id.
5
Marion Crain & Ken Matheney, Labor’s Identity Crisis, 89 CAL. L. REV. 1767, 178485 (2001).
6
Id. at 1785 (“Since Sweeney's ascendance to the presidency . . . , the AFL-CIO has
made significant progress in revitalizing itself through a renewed commitment to
organizing.”).
7
George Raine, Dissident Unions Put the Focus on Organizing, S.F. CHRON., July 31,
2005, at E1.
8
See, e.g., Cynthia A. Estlund, The Ossification of American Labor Law, 102 COLUM.
L. REV. 1527, 1529 (2002) (“Why has organized labor's share of the workforce shrunk
so dramatically?”).
9
See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, A Common Law for Labor Relations: A Critique of the
New Deal Labor Legislation, 92 YALE L.J. 1357, 1381-82 (1983) (discussing the
potential monopoly power of unions).
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question thus becomes: given these incentives, why have fewer and fewer
employees chosen to join unions?10
The National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) provides the legal
framework for employees to choose whether to have collective
representation in their relationship with the employer. Under the NLRA,
a majority vote determines whether the employees will or will not have a
labor organization11 as their representative at the bargaining table.12
Although the vote is a collective process, each employee must make an
individual choice – through a secret ballot – as to whether she wants such
representation. The National Labor Relations Board has famously
likened the representation election process to “a laboratory in which an
experiment may be conducted, under conditions as nearly ideal as
possible, to determine the uninhibited desires of the employees.”13
The Board has spent seventy years refining the conditions of this
laboratory. Countless Board decisions have parsed what an employer
may predict about the effects of unionization; what the employer may
promise to its employees during the pre-election “campaign” period; what
unions may promise to prospective members; and what effects a
misrepresentation will have on the parties. What is notable for its
absence, however, is the lack of any requirements that certain information
be disclosed to employees. Instead, the Board’s primary concern has
been curtailing certain types of information that it deems to have a
coercive or otherwise adulterating influence. The Board implicitly
assumes that the campaign between the union (in favor of its election
petition) and the employer (presumably opposed to the election petition)
will generate sufficient information for the employees to make an
informed and rational decision.
10

This puzzlement might be characterized as the “What’s the matter with Kansas?”
question for labor scholars. Cf. THOMAS FRANK, WHAT’S THE MATTER WITH KANSAS?
HOW CONSERVATIVES WON THE HEART OF AMERICA (2004) (asking why Kansans vote
against their economic self-interest). Frank took his title from a Samuel Gompers article
decrying Kansas legislation restricting the right to strike. Samuel Gompers, What’s the
Matter with Kansas?, 27 AM. FEDERATIONIST 155, 156 (1920).
11
The Act defines a "labor organization" as "any organization of any kind . . . in which
employee participate and which exists for the purpose, in whole or in part, of dealing
with employers concerning grievances, labor disputes, wages, rates of pay, hours of
employment, or conditions of work." 29 U.S.C. § 152(5) (2000).
12
Id. § 159.
13
General Shoe Corp., 77 NLRB 124, 127 (1948).
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This article challenges that assumption. In evaluating the regulation
of the representation campaign, both the Board and the majority of
commentators have based that their analyses of representation elections
on the model of a political campaign.14 This analogy is only natural, as
the election is conducted much the same way as an election for political
office. However, this comparison is misguided. Instead of seeing the
representation election as the end result of a political campaign, the
election should be treated as a collective economic decision about
whether to engage in a certain kind of activity. It is, in fact, a choice to
“purchase” union representation services.
Viewed in this manner, it becomes clear that the actors in the
“market” – namely, unions and employers – may not always provide the
information necessary for employees to make rational decisions about
union representation. As will be discussed, unions and employers do not
have the proper incentives to disclose certain types of information that
might be material to employees. In order to make the market more
efficient, policymakers should consider a regime of mandatory, up-front
disclosure.
In Part I, the article considers the current regulatory framework for
representation elections. This framework, based on the “laboratory
conditions” model, is fairly complex but relies almost exclusively on
prohibitions against certain types of speech or activity. Part II explores
important academic commentary that has suggested new approaches to
this framework. One school of commentators believes that the NLRB has
layered on too much regulation, while another believes that the NLRB
has not done enough to rein in employer abuses. However, both
ultimately provide incomplete answers by overlooking the role of
information in the representation campaign. Part III discusses reasons to
suspect that employees are not getting the information they need to make
rational economic decisions about union representation. Part IV contrasts
this lack of information with the regime of mandatory disclosure
currently imposed upon unions under the Labor-Management Reporting
and Disclosure Act (LMRDA). Drawing in part on the established
LMRDA framework, Part V then applies an information-disclosure model
to the representation process and sets forth the beginnings of a new
disclosure regime.
14

See, e.g., Derek C. Bok, The Regulation of Campaign Tactics in Representation
Elections under the National Labor Relations Act, 78 HARV. L. REV. 38 (1964).
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PART I: REGULATING THE REPRESENTATION ELECTION
A. The Basic Framework
Under the system established by the NLRA, the representation
process begins with a petition – filed by employees, a labor organization,
or an employer – avowing that a group of employees wish to be
represented by a particular labor organization. The petition proposes a
particular “bargaining unit” of employees – namely, a group of
employees that are deemed to share collective interests in the terms and
conditions of employment.15 The petition is generally accompanied by
evidence that employees support an election to determine the labor
organization’s status. At least thirty percent of the employees in the
proposed bargaining unit must support an election before the Board will
process the petition further.16 Pre-election hearings will be held if the
employer or employees wish to challenge the appropriateness of the
bargaining unit proposed by the petition.17 If the Board determines that
the unit is appropriate, it will move ahead with a secret ballot election.18
If the employees vote in favor of representation, the labor organization is
certified as the collective bargaining representative for all of the
employees in the unit.19 Although dissenting employees are not forced to
join the union, they may be forced to pay a pro rata share of the collective
representation costs incurred on their behalf.20
The NLRA itself does not provide many specifics on the election
process. The 1935 Wagner Act21 only provided that the Board designate
15

See Uyeda v. Brooks, 365 F.2d 326, 329 (6th Cir. 1966) (citing NLRB v. Ideal
Laundry & Dry Cleaning Co., 330 F.2d 712 (10th Cir. 1964)). A bargaining unit can
consist of a small number of employees with a particular job description, or it can be all
of an employer’s employees.
16
See 29 C.F.R. § 101.18(a) (2005).
17
Id. § 101.20(a).
18
Id. § 101.21.
19
See 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (2000).
20
29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (2000) (permitting employers to require union membership as a
condition of employment); NLRB v. General Motors Corp., 373 U.S. 734, 744-45
(1963) (permitting “agency shop” agreements whereby unions charge non-members for
the costs of collective representation).
21
The NLRA was created by the Wagner Act and has since been amended, most notably
by the 1947 Taft-Hartley Act.
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a representative selected by a majority of the unit employees.22 Initially,
the Board deemed evidence of employee sentiment presented at a hearing
sufficient to certify a union as representative.23 However, by 1939 the
Board had decided to require secret ballot elections to determine the will
of the majority.24 This change was codified in the 1947 Taft-Hartley
amendments, which provide that if a question of representation exists, the
Board “shall direct an election by secret ballot and shall certify the results
thereof.”25 Beyond the need for a secret ballot, the NLRA says little
about the election or the regulation of the period prior to the election
known as the “campaign period.”
Thus, the regulation of the election process was largely left to the
Board to implement. What exactly could be said, and what could not be
said? What would be the ramifications of prohibited conduct? It was
clear that under § 8(a)(1) of the NLRA, employers could not “interfere
with, restrain, or coerce” employees who were exercising rights protected
under § 7 of the Act. If an employer’s campaign activities rose to the
level of a § 8(a)(1) violation, they were undoubtedly prohibited. But
what about campaign activity that might intimidate or coerce employees,
but did not violate § 8(a)(1)? Congress had chosen to carve out a fairly
big chunk of such conduct for protection through § 8(c) of the NLRA.
According to § 8(c), “the expression of any views, argument, or opinion”
could not be deemed to an unfair labor practice “if such expression
contain[ed] no threat of reprisal or force or promise of benefit.”26 This
carve-out, intended in part to comply with the protections of the First
Amendment, could have also designated the line between prohibited and
permissible conduct during a representation campaign.
The Board chose to go in a different direction. In General Shoe
Corp., the Board established that "[i]n election proceedings, it is the
Board's duty to provide a laboratory in which an experiment may be
conducted, under conditions as nearly ideal as possible, to determine the
uninhibited desires of employees."27 In so holding, the Board found that
22

See Craig Becker, Democracy in the Workplace: Union Representation Elections and
Federal Labor Law, 77 MINN. L. REV. 495, 507 (1993).
23
Id. (noting that for the Board’s first five years roughly a quarter of all unions were
certified as representative without an election).
24
Cudahy Packing Co., 13 N.L.R.B. 526 (1939).
25
29 U.S.C. § 159(c) (2000).
26
29 U.S.C. § 158(c) (2000).
27
General Shoe, 77 NLRB at 127.
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conduct protected by § 8(c) could nevertheless be grounds for setting
aside an election. The Board rejected the claim that § 8(c) prohibited the
Board from relying on conduct other than an unfair labor practice to
overturn an election.28 Since the text of § 8(c) only spoke to the
definition of an unfair labor practice, the Board did not view it as a
limitation on the grounds for overturning an election.
General Shoe was not merely about the statutory application of § 8(c)
in the election context. It set forth a standard, a model, even a
philosophy, about how to regulate the representation campaign. The
metaphor is one of scientific process: a “laboratory” for an “experiment”
with “conditions as nearly ideal as possible” to determine the
“uninhibited desires” of employees. The messiness of the political
campaign, at least here, is not in evidence; instead, the Board’s purpose is
to remove anything that might obstruct or infringe upon the employees’
right to choose. In deciding whether to invalidate an election, the Board
stated that "our only consideration derives from the Act which calls for
freedom of choice by employees as to a collective bargaining
representative."29 Section 8(c)’s limitations on prohibited conduct were
not sufficient.
What then were the requirements of this laboratory? Although the
Board continues to rely on the “laboratory conditions” metaphor, at times
its allegiance to the underlying principle has been called into question.
What follows is a brief overview of the Board’s regulation of speech and
conduct during a representation campaign.
B. Prohibited Campaign Speech and Conduct
1. Coercion. Much of what is prohibited in the context of a
representation campaign is also a violation of § 8(a)(1). The most
obvious category of prohibited activity is coercion, either by union or by
employer. Any effort to compel the employee to vote a certain way is
deemed not only an infringement on the laboratory conditions but also a
trespass against employees’ protected rights. Although threats of
28

Id. at 127.
Id. at 126 (quoting P.D. Gwaltney, 74 NLRB 371 (1947)). This sentiment is probably
based on the Act’s Findings and Policies Section, which states that one of the declared
policies of the Act is to “protect[] the exercise by workers of full freedom of association,
self-organization, and designation of representatives of their own choosing . . . .” 29
U.S.C. § 151.
29
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physical violence are certainly prohibited, the more common concern is
threats of economic coercion by the employer. An employer may not
threaten to fire employees or change their working conditions if they
support the union.30 A threat to close a plant because of union activity is
also prohibited.31
However, the line becomes fuzzier when an employer is trying to
convince employees of the negative consequences of union
representation. The employer is permitted to inform employees about the
employer’s views on unionization, and unionization may in fact lead to
certain events that would make it more likely for the employer to close a
plant, perhaps out of economic necessity. Such information would be
important, perhaps critical, to an employee’s representation decision. But
an employer could easily frame threats and other coercion as campaign
“predictions.” Because the employer has the ultimate control over the
fate of the plant, the employer’s prediction looks more like a threat.
Thus, any regulation in this area must balance the free speech rights of
the employer with the rights of employees to be free from economic
coercion.
The Supreme Court broadly demarcated the boundaries of threat and
prediction in NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co.32 The Court held that “an
employer is free to communicate to his employees any of his general
views about unionism or any of his specific views about a particular
union, so long as the communications do not contain a threat of reprisal
or force or promise of benefit.”33 An employer may even make a
prediction about the impact unionization would have on the company.
However, such a prediction “must be carefully phrased on the basis of
objective fact to convey an employer’s belief as to demonstrably probable
consequences beyond his control or to convey a management decision
already arrived at to close the plant in case of unionization.”34 Any hint
that the “prediction” is instead a statement about what an employer might

30

See E.W. Grobbel Sons, 322 NLRB 304 (1996) (holding that a discontinuance of
benefits was an unlawful reprisal).
31
However, the employer may in fact shut down the plant after the election. Textile
Workers v. Darlington Mfg. Co., 380 U.S. 263, 274 n. 20 (1965).
32
395 U.S. 575 (1969).
33
Id. at 618.
34
Id.
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do solely on its own initiative would render such a prediction
impermissible.
In practice, the difference between permissible predictions and
unlawful threats has often rested on “fine distinctions.”35 Generally, an
employer is allowed to make purely objective statements about what has
happened in other unionized companies or what the employer’s customers
have stated with regard to the effects of unionization.36 However, any
interpretation of such “facts” that casts unionization in a negative light is
apt to turn the prediction into coercion. The Board and the U.S. Circuit
Courts have often differed on where this line is to be drawn. For
example, in DTR Industries, the Board found that an employer violated §
8(a)(1) through its pre-election letter which stated “our business would
automatically be reduced if the union wins the election.”37 However, the
Sixth Circuit refused enforcement, finding the letter to be a permissible
prediction based on objective fact.38
The Board has also found predictions about the futility of union
organizing are generally impermissible threats. The Board reads such
predictions as threats to engage in bad-faith bargaining and therefore
threats to engage in illegal activity.39 However, employers are permitted
to describe their own rights and remedies under the NLRA, even if such
descriptions paint a gloomy picture of unionization. For example, in what
might be characterized as the “bargaining from scratch” argument,
employers may tell employees that they are not required to agree to
anything when bargaining with the union, and that they have as much a
right to ask for wage and benefit reductions as the union has to ask for
increases.40 However, an employer may not use this assessment as a
threat to bargain in bad faith or a threat to reduce benefits illegally prior
to bargaining.41 Similarly, an employer may offer an opinion about the
possibility of union-called strikes, and may note that it has the right to
35

PATRICK HARDIN & JOHN E. HIGGINS, JR., THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW 131 (4th ed.
2001).
36
Id. at 130-31.
37
DTR Industries, 311 NLRB 833 (1993), enforcement denied, 39 F.3d 106 (6th Cir.
1994).
38
39 F.3d 106, 115 (6th Cir. 1994).
39
See, e.g., American Greetings Corp., 146 NLRB 1440, 1445 n.4 (1964).
40
See Fern Terrace Lodge of Bowling Green, 297 NLRB 8 (1989).
41
See, e.g., Golden Eagle Spotting Co., 319 NLRB 64 (1995); Advo Systems, 297
NLRB 926 (1990).
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permanently replace employees who go out on strike. Predictions of
violence are also prohibited if depicted as the inevitable consequence of
unionization. However, the Board has upheld an employer’s right to state
during a campaign that the union might send someone out to break
employees’ legs in order to collect dues.42
Ultimately, there is no clear line between impermissible threats and
permissible campaign rhetoric. The Board has emphasized the need to
look at the totality of the circumstances in figuring out where employer
campaign conduct falls. If the overall campaign has had a tendency to
threaten employees with possible violations of their collective rights, then
the Board will find a § 8(a)(1) violation and overturn the election.
However, such determinations, based as they are on a multi-factor
contextual test, will be subject to indeterminacy and uncertainty. As
such, they threaten either to under-deter coercive threats or over-deter the
provision of information that may be material to the employees’ decision.
2. Promises and Grants of Benefits. In keeping with its efforts to
protect the “uninhibited desires” of employees, the NLRA also prohibits
bribery. The employer may not promise to better employees’ terms and
conditions in exchange for support of or opposition to the union. In a
famous passage, the Supreme Court described the rationale for the
prohibition this way:
The danger inherent in well-timed increases in benefits is
the suggestion of a fist inside the velvet glove. Employees
are not likely to miss the inference that the source of
benefits now conferred is also the source from which future
benefits must flow and which may dry up if not obliged.43
The Board and the courts have interpreted § 8(a)(1) to prohibit
suspiciously-timed benefits even when no strings are explicitly attached.
In order to provide its employees with improved terms of employment
during the course of the representation campaign, the employer must
show that its actions were motivated by factors other than the campaign.44
Clear evidence that the employer had been planning such an improvement
42

Sears Roebuck & Co., 305 NLRB 193 (1991).
NLRB v. Exchange Parts Co., 375 U.S. 405 (1964).
44
American Sunroof Corp., 248 NLRB 748 (1980), enforced in part, 667 F.2d 20 (6th
Cir. 1981).
43
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before notice of the campaign will allow the employer to proceed. But if
the benefit is discretionary, and the employer’s decision not dictated by
its previous behavior, the Board may very well find an implicit attempt to
interfere with the campaign. So too may efforts by an employer to solicit
or remedy employee grievances be deemed impermissible interference.45
The Board has determined that suggestion boxes and employee hotlines
may amount to an implied promise to remedy employee grievances and
thereby would be impermissible under § 8(a)(1).46 However, it should
also be noted that any efforts to scale back on benefits that would have
otherwise been granted (absent the campaign) would also be a § 8(a)(1)
violation. Thus, employers must tread carefully in this area: they may be
liable for both decisions to grant benefits and decisions not to grant
benefits, depending on the circumstances.
Union promises about securing certain terms and conditions have
been held to be permissible, since employees, in the Board’s view,
recognize that such promises are “dependent on contingencies beyond the
Union’s control.”47 However, unions are not permitted to offer tangible,
valuable benefits to employees in the context of a representation
campaign. Elections have been invalidated after union gifts of life
insurance coverage,48 jackets,49 hats and shirts,50 and alcoholic drinks.51
Here, too, however, there has been indeterminacy. One court ruled that a
union’s promise to hold “the biggest party in the history of Texas” if it
won was an impermissible inducement,52 while another held that a
promise of a victory dinner dance was not objectionable.53 The Board
and the courts have also wrestled over the permissibility of union lawsuits
against employers on behalf of employees in the midst of a representation
campaign.54
45

See, e.g., Bell Halter, Inc., 276 NLRB 1208 (1985).
See DTR Industries, 311 NLRB 833 (1993); Torbitt & Castleman, Inc., 320 NLRB
907 (1996).
47
Smith Co., 192 NLRB 1098, 1101 (1971).
48
Wagner Elec. Corp., 167 NLRB 532 (1967).
49
Owens-Illinois, Inc., 271 NLRB 1235 (1984).
50
NLRB v. Shrader’s, Inc., 928 F.2d 194 (6th Cir. 1991).
51
Revco D.S. v. NLRB, 830 F.2d 70 (6th Cir. 1987).
52
Trencor, Inc. v. NLRB, 110 F.3d 268, 272 (5th Cir. 1997).
53
NLRB v. L & J Equipment Co., 745 F.2d 224 (3d Cir. 1984).
54
See, e.g., Nestle Ice Cream v. N.L.R.B., 46 F.3d 578, 584 (6th Cir. 1995) (concluding
that union lawsuit on behalf of employees for overtime pay was an impermissible bribe).
46
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Union offers to waive employee initiation fees have received
sustained scrutiny from the Board and the courts. The basic principle was
established in NLRB v. Savair Manufacturing Co.,55 which held that
unions cannot offer to waive initiation fees for employees who sign
authorization cards before an election.56 The Court held that such a
practice would allow the union to “buy endorsements and paint a false
portrait of employee support during its election campaign.”57 However,
the Court’s ruling did allow for the waiver of initiation fees more
generally: specifically, the waiver had to be open “not only to those who
have signed up with the union before an election but also those who join
after the election.”58 As a result, the Board and circuit courts have been
left to parse exactly what a union may say in conveying the waiver during
the campaign. The Board and the Seventh Circuit found the union’s
waiver unobjectionable when it stated that it “usually does not charge an
Initiation Fee” until some time after the election, despite the “usually.”59
However, when a union offered to waive fees only to “charter members”
without explaining the term,60 or said that fees would be waived for
“anyone joining now, during this campaign,”61 such promises were held
to violate laboratory principles. The Board permits unions to clarify or
correct objectionable waiver offers but holds them to a fairly high
standard of clarity.62
55

414 U.S. 270 (1973).
Id. at 277.
57
Id.
58
Id. at 272 n.4.
59
Certain-Teed Products Corp. v. NLRB, 562 F.2d 500 (7th Cir. 1977), enforcing 225
NLRB 971 (1976).
60
Inland Shoe Mfg. Co., 211 NLRB 724 (1974).
61
Crane Co., 225 NLRB 657 (1976).
62
See, e.g., Claxton Mfg. Co., 258 NLRB 417 (1981) (holding that letter promising no
initiation fees “as of this day” was too ambiguous to clarify earlier impermissible waiver
offer). An interesting twist on the Savair line of cases involves one union’s requirement
that a majority of employees prepay a reduced initiation fee and one month’s dues in
order for the union to file an election petition. Aladdin Hotel Corp., 229 NLRB 499
(1977). If the union lost the election, the prepaid amounts were forfeit to the union in
order to pay for the costs of the campaign. If the union won the election, it opened up
the reduced initiation fees to all employees for a period of time after the election. The
Board, in a 3-2 decision, upheld the policy, finding that it offered the reduced initiation
fee before and after the election. Id. at 500. In dissent, two members argued that the
lock-in and forfeiture provisions would interfere with employees freedom of choice. Id.
at 501-02 (Members Penello and Walther, dissenting). The Ninth Circuit declined to
56
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3. Inflammatory appeals. As part of the laboratory conditions
doctrine, the Board prohibits appeals to racial prejudice or pride that it
deems too “inflammatory” for the campaign. The seminal case in this
area is Sewell Manufacturing Co.,63 in which the employer appealed to
racial prejudice in its anti-union campaign efforts. The employer linked
the union to unrelated desegregation efforts and used a picture of a white
union official dancing with a black woman in its campaign literature.64
The Board found such conduct to be grounds for a new election.
According to the Board, racial appeals were only permissible if they were
truthful, germane to the election, and not overly inflammatory.65
The Sewell standard has resulted in a hodge-podge of rulings that, as
in other areas, lack the clarity and coherence necessary for uniform
application. The Board has generally applied a more lenient standard to
appeals of racial pride and solidarity; indeed, such appeals may be a
legitimate part of an effort to improve terms of pay and working
conditions.66 However, the U.S. Courts of Appeal have been less
forgiving and have clashed with the Board about such campaign tactics.67
The Board has also generally held that appeals to racial prejudice have to
be “sustained” in order to meet the prohibited threshold, causing further
disagreement. Here too circuit courts have been more willing to overturn
elections based on racist remarks despite the Board’s willingness to

enforce the Board’s order after finding the union’s letter to be ambiguous as to the
timing of the waiver offer. NLRB v. Aladdin Hotel Corp., 584 F.2d 891 (9th Cir. 1978).
63
138 NLRB 66 (1962).
64
Id. at 67.
65
Id. at 71-72.
66
See, e.g., Baltimore Luggage Co., 162 NLRB 1230, 1233 -34 (1967) (noting that
appeals to racial unity may be “directed at undoing disadvantages historically imposed”
and may be a way to “unify groups of employees by focusing group attention on
common problems”).
67
See, e.g., NLRB v. Schapiro & Whitehouse, 356 F.2d 675 (4th Cir. 1966) (refusing to
enforce bargaining order because of appeals to racial pride); KI (USA) Corp., 35 F.3d
256, 260 (6th Cir. 1994) (denying enforcement of a bargaining order based on the
union’s use of a letter by a Japanese businessman which allegedly inflamed racial
tensions); Case Farms v. NLRB, 128 F.3d 841, 850 (4th Cir. 1991) (Willams, J.,
concurring in judgment) (expressing “concern with the Board's apparent disregard for
the decisions of the Circuit Courts” in matters of concerning inflammatory racial
appeals).
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tolerate limited instantiations of such behavior.68 The vague standards,
combined with the concern that legitimate speech may be prohibited,
have led to calls for reform of this doctrine.69
4. Misrepresentations. The regulation of misrepresentations is
perhaps the most infamous example of the Board’s willingness to depart
from precedent, as demonstrated by a series of decisions in the 1970s
which piled reversal on reversal on reversal. Before we get to these
cases, however, it is important to note what they are not about: namely,
the Board’s overall approach to misrepresentations. The Board has not
wavered from its generally-held view that misrepresentations are not
prohibited during the election campaign. As the Board noted,
“exaggeration, inaccuracies, half-truths, and name calling, though not
condoned, will not be grounds for setting aside an election.”70 The Board
stated: “absolute precision of statement and complete honesty are not
always attainable in an election campaign, nor are they expected by
employees.”71 Thus, unlike the strict rules of truthfulness in such
contexts as the corporate proxy contest,72 the Board has taken a relatively
relaxed approach to misrepresentations throughout its history.
From 1962 to 1977, the Board did regulate a subset of
misrepresentations that it felt had a particularly nefarious effect on the
representation campaign. The rule, established in Hollywood Ceramics
Co.,73 stated:
[A]n election should be set aside only where there has been
a misrepresentation or other campaign trickery, which
involves a substantial departure from the truth, at a time
which prevents the other party or parties from making an
effective reply, so that the misrepresentation, whether
68

See, e.g., M&M Supermarkets v. NLRB, 818 F.2d 1567 (11th Cir. 1987); NLRB v.
Eurodrive, 724 F.2d 556 (6th Cir. 1984); NLRB v. Triplex Mfg. Co., 701 F.2d 703 (7th
Cir. 1983). Cf. Clearwater Transport, Inc. v. NLRB, 133 F.3d 1004, 1010 (7th Cir. 1998)
(voicing a “strong objection” to the NLRB’s “seemingly casual reading” of past
precedent in such cases).
69
See, e.g., Shepard Tissue, Inc., 326 NLRB 369, 369-73 (1998) (Gould, Chairman,
concurring) (arguing for a new approach to the Sewell doctrine).
70
Hollywood Ceramics Co., 140 NLRB 221, 226 n.6 (1962).
71
Id. at 223.
72
See SEC Rule 14a-9, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-9 (2004).
73
140 NLRB 221 (1962).
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deliberate or not, may reasonably be expected to have a
significant impact on the election.74
Thus, a simple misrepresentation was clearly not enough to negate the
campaign. The election objection would be struck if the
misrepresentation concerned an unimportant matter or had no significant
impact or was made at a time that allowed for effective rebuttal or
correction. A misrepresentation would also be insufficient to overturn the
election if it was so exaggerated as to be unbelievable or if employees had
sufficient information already to permit them to evaluate the
misrepresentation properly.75 Obviously, many of these factors are
subject to vagaries of interpretation: “substantial departure,” “significant
impact,” sufficient time for an “effective reply.” Once again, the Board’s
standard was subject to the usual criticisms.76
The Board overruled Hollywood Ceramics in its 1977 Shopping Kart
decision.77 In that decision, the Board washed its hands of any regulation
of campaign misrepresentations. In coming to its conclusion, the Board
cited several academic works, including two pieces discussed below.78
Noting that the Hollywood Ceramics rule had been criticized for its
vagueness and indeterminacy, the Board argued that such attention to
campaign propaganda was unnecessary. In fact, it argued that “Board
rules in this area must be based on a view of employees as mature
individuals who are capable of recognizing campaign propaganda for
what it is and discounting it.”79 To hold otherwise would be to
countenance “a view of employees as naive and unworldly whose
decision on as critical an issue as union representation is easily altered by
the self-serving campaign claims of the parties.”80 The three-member
majority, citing studies about actual employee behavior during election

74

Id. at 224.
Id.
76
Bok, supra note DB1.
77
Shopping Kart Food Market, 228 NLRB 1311 (1977).
78
Julius Getman & Stephen Goldberg, The Behavioral Assumptions Underlying NLRB
Regulation of Campaign Misrepresentations: An Empirical Evaluation, 28 STAN. L.
REV. 263 (1976); Bok, supra note DB1; ROBERT E. WILLIAMS, PETER A. JANUS, AND
KENNETH C. HUHN, NLRB REGULATION OF ELECTION CONDUCT (1974).
79
Shopping Kart, 228 NLRB at 1313.
80
Id.
75
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campaigns,81 felt that employees could properly evaluate the truth and
falsity of campaign claims themselves.82
A year later, the Board reversed course, and a three-member majority
in General Knit of California returned to theHollywood Ceramics
standard.83 The majority took on the principles enunciated in Shopping
Kart, stating that the Shopping Kart majority was “in error” as to its basic
view of campaign behavior.84 The Hollywood Ceramics standard,
according to the majority, was not premised on a view that employees
were “naïve and unworldly.”85 Instead, the majority argued that “no
matter what the ultimate sophistication of a particular electorate, there are
certain circumstances where a particular misrepresentation or
misrepresentations may materially affect an election.”86 Accordingly,
“employees should be afforded a degree of protection from overzealous
campaigners who distort the issues by substantial misstatements of
relevant and material facts within the special knowledge of the
campaigner, so shortly before the election that there is no effective time
for reply.”87 The dissenters-turned-majority jousted with the empirical
studies cited by the Shopping Kart majority,88 and argued that the old
standard could be enforced in a vigorous yet consistent manner.89
Four years later, however, the hands-off policy of Shopping Kart was
yet again reinstated by a three-member Board majority in Midland

81

Id. (citing Getman & Goldberg, supra note JG2, at 276-79). The dissenting Members
took issue with the majority’s use of the study, noting inter alia that 22 percent of
employees had “precise recall” (within ten percent) of union claims about wages made
by union employees elsewhere. Shopping Kart, 228 NLRB at 1315-16 (Fanning &
Jenkins, Mems., dissenting in part). One of the dissenters then separately wrote to
criticize the study itself. Id. at 1318 (Jenkins, Mem., dissenting) (criticizing the Getman
& Goldberg article for “nonprobative factual data and non sequitur logic”).
82
However, one member of the majority wrote in concurrence that she would set aside
an election if there had been an “egregious mistake of fact.” Id. at 1314 (Murphy,
Chair., concurring).
83
General Knit of California, 239 NLRB 619 (1978).
84
Id. at 620.
85
Id.
86
Id.
87
Id. (quoting Shopping Kart Food Market, 228 NLRB 1311, 1315 (1977) (Fanning &
Jenkins, Mems., dissenting in part)).
88
General Knit, 239 NLRB at 621-22.
89
Id. at 622-23.
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National Life Insurance Co.90 After reviewing the history of the Board’s
treatment of misrepresentations,91 the majority argued in favor of the
bright-line, hands-off standard, citing the “many difficulties attending the
Hollywood Ceramics rule,” as well as the need for “the certainty and
finality of election results.” 92 Although the majority reaffirmed the view
that “mature individuals who are capable of recognizing campaign
propaganda for what it is and discounting it,”93 it did not spend much
time on this issue, nor did it refer to the empirical studies debated in
Shopping Kart and General Knit. The majority did make clear that the
Board still would overturn election in instances “where a party has used
forged documents which render the voters unable to recognize
propaganda for what it is.”94
The decision in Midland remains the law. Interestingly, some circuit
courts have been rather grumbling in their acceptance of the Midland
standard. In NLRB v. New Columbus Nursing Home,95 the First Circuit
endorsed the Board’s holding below, but noted that “we do not
necessarily endorse application of the Midland rule to situations involving
charges of more fundamental and clear-cut misrepresentations.”96
Noting that the Board had “a duty to provide reasonably for the
employees' ‘unhampered freedom of choice,’” the court held that a strict
adherence to Midland might, in some cases, “constitute legal error.”97
Similarly, the Sixth Circuit has held that "[t]here may be cases where no
forgery can be proved, but where the misrepresentation is so pervasive
and the deception so artful that employees will be unable to separate truth
from untruth and where their right to a free and fair choice will be
affected."98 The Sixth Circuit continues to apply this standard to

90

Midland Nat’l Life Ins. Co., 263 NLRB 127 (1982).
Id. at 129-30.
92
Id. at 131.
93
Id. at 132 (quoting Shopping Kart, 228 NLRB at 1313).
94
Midland, 263 NLRB at 133.
95
NLRB v. New Columbus Nursing Home, 720 F.2d 726 (1st Cir. 1983).
96
Id. at 729.
97
Id. (citation omitted). In concurrence, Judge Bailey Aldrich wrote: “Midland seems to
be burning down the barn to get rid of the rats; an abnegation of the Board's recognized
duty to ensure a fair and free choice of bargaining.”
98
Van Dorn Plastics Machinery Co. v. NLRB, 736 F.2d 343, 348 (6th Cir. 1984).
91
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misrepresentation cases.99 While other circuit courts have adopted the
Midland standard,100 a number of circuit courts, including ones in circuits
that have adopted it, have not yet decided whether to “fully support” the
standard.101
C. Information Disclosure in the Representation Campaign
Despite the finely-grained regulation of what cannot be said during
the representation campaign, the Board has done little to require
information disclosure from the parties. There are no affirmative
disclosure requirements on the part of employers or unions to provide
certain kinds of information to employees. In Florida Mining &
Materials Corp., the Board rejected the employer's efforts to impose an
"affirmative disclosure" requirement on the pre-election process.102 In
that case, the union failed to reveal to the employees that the day before
the election, it had been placed under temporary trusteeship by the
international union. The employer sought to overturn the election based
on the union's failure to disclose. The authority of the Board to impose
such a rule was not questioned; however, the Board refused to do so
based on its concerns about the administrative burden it would cause.
The Fifth Circuit found that the Board had not abused its discretion.103
The only instance of such required disclosure is not information that
must be disclosed to employees, but rather information that the employer
must disclose to the petitioning union. In Excelsior Underwear, Inc., the
99

See N.L.R.B. v. St. Francis Healthcare Centre, 212 F.3d 945, 963-66 (6th Cir. May 19,
2000); N.L.R.B. v. Hub Plastics, Inc., 52 F.3d 608, 611-13 (6th Cir. May 08, 1995).
100
C.J. Krehbiel Co. v. NLRB, 844 F.2d 880, 883-84 (D.C. Cir. 1988); State Bank of
India v. NLRB, 808 F.2d 526, 538-39 (7th Cir. 1986); NLRB v. Semco Printing Ctr.,
Inc., 721 F.2d 886, 892 (2d Cir. 1983); NLRB v. Monark Boat Co., 713 F.2d 355, 360
(8th Cir. 1983); NLRB v. Yellow Transp. Co., 709 F.2d 1342 (9th Cir. 1983).
101
Trencor Inc. v. NLRB, 110 F.3d 268, 276 (5th Cir. 1997) (holding that it was
“unnecessary to determine the full scope of this court’s support for the Midland
doctrine”). See also NLRB v. Dave Transportation Co., 1999 WL 196545, at *1 n.1 (9th
Cir. April 1, 1999) (unpublished) (noting that they need not decide whether an exception
to Midland is warranted); St. Margaret Memorial Hosp. v. N.L.R.B., 991 F.2d 1146,
1158 (3d Cir. 1993) (noting in dicta that the Midland rule might not be sufficient in all
cases); NLRB v. Affiliated Midwest Hospital, 789 F.2d 524, 528 n.3 (7th Cir. 1986)
(noting that it need not reach the issue of whether the circuit should recognize an
exception to Midland).
102
Florida Mining & Materials Corp., 198 NLRB 601, enf'd 481 F.2d 65 (5th Cir. 1973).
103
Id.
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Board required employers to provide the union with the names and
addresses of employees in the unit.104 This information is required within
seven days of the approval of an election agreement; the Union need not
request it.105 In explaining why it was requiring this information, the
Board noted:
. . . [W]e regard it as the Board's function to conduct
elections in which employees have the opportunity to cast
their ballots for or against representation under
circumstances that are free not only from interference,
restraint, or coercion violative of the Act, but also from
other elements that prevent or impede free and reasoned
choice. Among the factors that undoubtedly tend to impede
such choice is a lack of information with respect to one of
the choices available. . . . Accordingly, we think it is
appropriate for us to remove the impediment to
communication to which our new rule is directed.106
Thus, the primary justification for the Excelsior requirement is
presumably to give the union the ability to send materials and other
communications to the employees at their home address. There is
evidence that unions have taken advantage of the lists for this purpose. In
their empirical study of thirty-one union representation elections,
Getman, Goldberg and Herman found that employers sent written
materials to employees in twenty-six of those elections, while union sent
written materials in twenty-five.107 In these elections, 92 percent of
employees reported receiving employer material, while 85 percent
reported receiving union material.108
Although the Excelsior decision was designed to facilitate greater
information disclosure, in other respects the Board and the courts have
104

One commentator has proposed that unions be given private employee email
addresses as part of the Excelsior disclosure. G. Micah Wissinger, Informing Workers of
the Right to Workplace Representation: Reasonably Moving from the Middle of the
Highway to the Information Superhighway, 78 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 331, 342-43 (2003).
105
Excelsior Underwear, Inc., 156 NLRB 1236, 1239-40 (1966).
106
Id. at 1240 (quotations and citations omitted).
107
JULIUS G. GETMAN ET AL., UNION REPRESENTATION ELECTIONS: LAW AND REALITY
90 (1976).
108
Id.
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failed to pursue this goal. There is no structured forum in which the
union is given a chance to make its case to employees. If the union
wishes to speak with employees, it must do so off-site and outside of
working hours. An employer, by contrast, can require employees to
attend a meeting in which it presents an anti-union case. Such meetings,
known as “captive audience speech,” gives employers a much better
opportunity to make their case to employees.109 In their study of 31 union
representation elections, Professors Getman, Goldberg, and Herman
found that employers held captive-audience meetings in 28 of those
elections, making such meetings more frequent than the distribution of
written materials.110 Employee attendance at such meetings was high.111
Although unions held off-site meetings in many of the 31 elections, a
much smaller percentage of employees reported attending such
meetings.112 The authors note that those employees who did attend union
meetings were much more likely to be union adherents.113
Union access to employees even in public places can be restricted by
the employer. In Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB,114 the Supreme Court held that
employers could prohibit all non-employee solicitation and distribution,
including union solicitation, on its retail parking lot. The Court ruled that
the employer’s property rights trumped the union’s right to access unless
the union could show that the employees could not be reached by other
means. The burden of proving such lack of access was a “heavy one,” as
there was a presumption that the employees could be reached unless they
actually lived on the employer’s property.115 A recent Board decision has
109

See Alan Story, Employer Speech, Union Representation Elections, and the First
Amendment, 16 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 356, 415 (noting the “obvious point that
allowing employers to hold such meetings, especially absent an opportunity for the
union to do likewise, gives employers a strong advantage over unions”).
110
GETMAN ET AL., supra note JG1, at 90-92.
111
Id.
112
Id. As part of their reforms, Professors Getman, Goldberg and Herman propose that
unions be given the opportunity for equal access to employees during working hours if
employers use working time for their campaign. Id.
113
Id.
114
502 U.S. 527 (1992).
115
Id. at 535, 540. This Board and the courts have permitted union access on employer
property for employees working at a remote lumber camp, NLRB v. Lake Superior
Lumber Corp., 167 F.2d 147 (6th Cir. 1948); in a company town, NLRB v. Stowe
Spinning Co., 336 U.S. 226 (1949); and at a fish cannery, Chugach Alaska Fisheries,
295 NLRB 44 (1989).
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extended Lechmere to allow a grocery store to prohibit nonemployee
union organizers from using the snack bar in its store.116
Employers are allowed considerable leeway in restricting the flow of
information between employees. Although employees are able to solicit
their fellow workers on the job, employers can restrict such solicitations
to non-working hours.117 Moreover, the employer may limit employees
to oral solicitations in working areas.118 The employer can forbid the
distribution of literature in working areas due to the threat of litter and
disruption of productive order.119 Such a prohibition must apply to all
such distributions, and it must be applied neutrally.120 An employer can
also extend non-discriminatory literature prohibitions to company bulletin
boards121 and even computer screen savers.122 An employer also has the
right to prohibit solicitations, including union solicitations, on its own
internal e-mail, as long as it does so non-discriminatorily.123
Finally, it is perhaps unnecessary to note that the Board itself takes no
role in disseminating information during the representation campaign.
One might envision a much more active Board which served as a
repository for information about the campaign and took steps to make
sure employees received that information. For example, the SEC plays
such a role with corporate disclosure: its EDGAR system offers free and
simple access to millions of corporate documents regarding IPOs, annual
statements, and proxy contests.124 The possibility that the NLRB might
be able to play a similar role in the representation context will be
discussed further below.
D. The Neutrality Agreement: Opting Out of the Board’s Process
Any discussion of the representation election would be incomplete
without reference to the growing importance of neutrality agreements.
116

Farm Fresh, 326 NLRB 997 (1998). For criticism of the Lechmere decision, see
Cynthia L. Estlund, Labor, Property, and Sovereignty after Lechmere, 46 STAN. L. REV.
305 (1994).
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Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793 (1945).
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Stoddard-Quirk Mfg. Co., 138 NLRB 615 (1962).
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See, e.g., Marathon LeTourneau Co. v. NLRB, 699 F.2d 248 (5th Cir. 1983) (XXX).
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Honeywell, Inc., 262 NLRB 1402 (1982).
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St. Joseph’s Hospital, 337 NLRB 94 (2001).
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E. I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co., 311 NLRB 893, 919 (1993).
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The neutrality agreement is a contract between a union and an employer
in which the employer agrees to remain neutral while the union endeavors
to win the support of a majority of employees. Such agreements come
with a range of procedures. The simplest of these agreements only
requires employer neutrality during the campaign, with the union then
having to succeed in a Board-run election to obtain representation.
However, some neutrality agreements also require the employer to
recognize the union if it obtains signatures on representation cards from a
majority of employees (known as a card-check majority). This stronger
form essentially allows the parties to opt out of the NLRB’s
representation policies. Unions began negotiating neutrality agreements
in the 1970s and their popularity has substantially increased. In a survey
of four of the nation’s biggest unions, James Brudney found that “a
plurality or majority of newly organized members have come in through
contractual arrangements rather than traditional Board supervised election
campaigns.”125 In fact, Brudney asserts that “[a]s a factual matter, Board
elections have ceased to be the dominant mechanism for determining
whether employees want union representation.”126
The attraction of neutrality agreements for unions is clear. A recent
study of neutrality agreements found that when such agreements included
a card check provision, the union secured representation of the employees
78 percent of the time.127 It is less clear why employers would agree to
them. In many cases, the employer has a preexisting relationship with the
union as to other employees, and it can negotiate a neutrality agreement
in the context of a larger series of negotiations.128 The most prominent
neutrality agreements include ones in the telecommunications and auto

125

James Brudney, Neutrality Agreements and Card Check Recognition: Prospects for
Changing Paradigms, 90 IOWA L. REV. 819, 829-30 (2005).
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Id. at 824.
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(unpublished manuscript), cited in Brudney, supra note JB1, at 835; Roger C. Hartley,
Non-Legislative Labor Law Reform and Pre-Recognition Labor Neutrality Agreements:
The Newest Civil Rights Movement, 22 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 369, 387-89
(2001).
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industries, which have a high union density.129 Unions have also had
some success in securing neutrality agreements through corporate
campaigns.130 In addition, some state and local government agencies now
require or encourage employers to sign neutrality agreements in order to
be eligible for governmental contracts.131 In Las Vegas, the Hotel and
Restaurant Employees (HERE) and the Service Employees International
Union (SEIU) have used all three of these factors to support their drive
for neutrality agreements to great success.132
Despite their increasing popularity, it is difficult to say how pervasive
neutrality agreements may eventually become. Employers who oppose
unionization will not sign them voluntarily, and to this point unions have
only been able to apply pressure in a limited spectrum of special
circumstances. It is possible that these circumstances may increase, but it
is also possible that unions have exhausted many of them. In addition,
Congress has considered legislation to prohibit employer recognition
based on a card-check majority.133 Although it seems unlikely that such a
prohibition would pass, the most recent bill did garner fifty-seven cosponsors. Finally, it is unclear whether the NLRB will accord deference
to the results of a card-check certification mandated by a neutrality
agreement. In a recent order, the Board granted review of a case
involving the application of the “recognition bar” doctrine in the context
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of a neutrality agreement.134 The Board has traditionally recognized that
“voluntary recognition of a union in good faith based on demonstrated
majority status will bar a petition for a reasonable period of time.”135
However, the majority in Dana distinguished the traditional rule by
noting that such precedent “is based upon a union's obtaining signed
authorization cards from a majority of the unit employees before entering
into the agreement with an employer, while in both of the instant cases,
an agreement was reached between the union and the employer before
authorization cards, evidencing the majority status, were obtained.”136
Although it only granted review on the issue and made no final
determination, the order still generated a strong dissent.137 If the Board
ultimately disallows the recognition bar in the card-check neutrality
agreement context, then employers and employees will be free to file
decertification petitions soon after the employer has recognized the union
through the card-check process.138
The strongest argument against neutrality agreement is the potential
impairment of employee free choice. Anti-union organizations and
commentators have criticized neutrality agreements as opportunities for
union intimidation and misinformation to carry the day.139 Critics of
134
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card-check neutrality agreements have cited the lack of a “fully informed
electorate”140 under such agreements as well as the need for employees to
“hear[] views on as many sides of the issue as possible.”141 The NLRB
itself echoed these concerns when it said that “the fact remains that the
secret-ballot election remains the best method for determining whether
employees desire union representation.”142 As I will discuss later,143
required disclosure in the context of a representation decision, whether it
be a card check or a secret-ballot election, would alleviate many of the
concerns raised by such procedures while preserving the features that
make them attractive to unions and their proponents.
PART II: CRITICAL APPROACHES TO THE BOARD’S REPRESENTATION
CAMPAIGN REGULATION
As others have noted in the past, there has been few prominent works
of legal scholarship on the regulation of the union representation
campaign.144 The four primary works can be broken down by decade:
Derek Bok in the 1960s,145 Julius Getman, along with Stephen Goldberg
and Jeanne Herman, in the 1970s,146 Paul Weiler in the 1980s,147 and
Craig Becker in the 1990s.148 Although each of these works has its own
focus, they sound primarily on two themes. Bok and Getman focus on
the administrative delay and inefficiency caused by the Board’s
regulation of the labor campaign, while Weiler and Becker focus on
employer campaign coercion that manages to survive Board regulation
and defeat the free will of employees. These articles, and their proposed
reforms, are discussed below.

indication of whether they really want union representation. The unions know this.
That's why they want card check elections instead of secret ballot elections.”).
140
2002 House Hearings, supra note HH2002, at 100 (statement of Charles I. Cohen).
141
2002 House Hearings, supra note HH2002, at 105 (statement of Daniel Yager).
142
Dana Corp., 341 N.L.R.B. No. 150, 2004 WL 1329345 at *1 (June 7, 2004).
143
See infra Part IV.
144
Becker, supra note CB1, at 497.
145
Bok, supra note DB1.
146
GETMAN ET AL., supra note JG1.
147
Paul Weiler, Promises to Keep: Securing Workers’ Rights to Self-Organization
Under the NLRA, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1769 (1983).
148
Becker, supra note CB1.

27

INFORMATION & REPRESENTATION ELECTIONS

A. The Problem of Bureaucratic Obstruction: Derek Bok and Julius
Getman et al.
Derek Bok is one of the most important labor law scholars of the past
century. Prior to becoming the president of Harvard University, Bok
wrote a number of foundational articles at a time when labor law, as both
a practical and academic subject, was at the peak of its own
importance.149 Bok’s vision of labor law shared many commonalities
with another labor law giant, Julius Getman. An author of books and
articles critical to the labor law pantheon, Getman shared Bok’s concern
with administrative efficiency in the face of a growing bureaucracy.
While supportive of the labor movement, both men might be better
characterized as centrists in their approach to labor policy.
One of Bok’s most important articles was directly on the issue of the
regulation of union representation elections.150 Bok’s approach to the
issue centered on what he saw as the “instability” and “[i]nconsistencies”
of the Board’s doctrine in the area.151 Bok felt that the inconsistencies
reflected “a deeper uncertainty regarding the nature of the election
process itself.”152 Bok also noted that in trying to keep the election
campaign process free of coercion, the Board relied on inferences about
human behavior that may or may not be supportable.153 He claimed that
if the Board’s only guiding principle was to keep employee free from
undue interference, the Board’s regulatory approach would continue to be
incoherent and unstable.154 Instead, Bok argued that the Board should
focus on a set of “legitimate interests” held by the parties involved.155
The first “legitimate interest” discussed by Bok is that of free choice.
In this regard, he stated:
We may assume that one basic purpose of an election is to
permit the voters to make as rational, and hence as
accurate, a decision as they can concerning the issue before
them. In the context of a representation election, a rational
149
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decision implies that employees have access to relevant
information, that they use this data to determine the
possible consequences of selecting or rejecting the union,
and that they appraise these possibilities in light of their
own values and desires to determine whether a vote for the
union promises to promote or impair their interests.156
Bok’s description of an employee exercising free choice describes the
same process envisioned by law and economics models when rational
actors are making cost-benefit decisions about economic choices. After
setting up this model, however, he immediately expressed skepticism
about its correlation with reality. Citing to works about the irrationality
of decisions made in political elections, Bok acknowledged that perhaps
the union representation decision is more suited to rational choice.157 But
in the end, Bok believed there was little role for law in making the
process more rational.
Bok arrived at this conclusion by breaking down an employee’s union
representation decision into three questions: (1) Are conditions within the
plant satisfactory? (2) To what extent can the union improve on these
conditions? (3) Will representation by the union bring countervailing
disadvantages as a result of dues payments, strikes, or bitterness within
the plant?158 While employees may be “best equipped” to answer the first
question, according to Bok, studies showed that employees misconceive
the nature of their problems and may transfer concerns about other issues
into an irrational focus on wages.159 As to the second question, Bok
believed that the employee would be “hard pressed to decide to what
extent a union can improve upon the situation.”160 Bok discussed how
claims by the union about improvements at other companies would be
rebutted by the employer in ways that employees would be “in a poor
position to resolve.”161 Regarding the third question, Bok argued that
employees would be “particularly handicapped” in resolving this issue, as
156
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the answer depended on resolving a series of sub-issues for which there
would often be “little evidence beyond partisan statements of employers
and organizers and the anecdotal accounts of associates . . . .”162
Bok thus made clear that he believed informational difficulties stood
in the way of employees making rational representation decisions. As
Bok noted, employees generally have little direct, personal information
about the union, and there is little such information or analysis in the
media and other independent sources. Given the lack of information on
the critical questions posed by Bok, he argued that employees were not
making rational economic decisions by sifting the evidence, but rather
were basing their votes on factors irrelevant to a rational determination.
As catalogued by Bok, such factors could include: the skillfulness of the
union’s organizing strategy, the employer’s response to the organizing
drive, the “likability” of both union and employer representatives, the
opinions of certain “key employees” within the plant, community opinion
of unions generally, and the background and past experiences of each
employee.163 But ultimately, Bok concluded there was no rational
economic calculus behind these elections.
Bok acknowledged that given the informational disparities, it might
make more sense for government to play a more invasive role in the
regulation of campaign information.164 However, Bok rejected this
conclusion. He concluded, first, that there are insufficient grounds for
determining what kinds of regulation might actually assist in making
more rational determinations.165 More importantly, however, Bok also
believed that “[w]hen employees are unable to form a reasoned judgment
on the effects of a union, given the complexity of the issues and the
limited information at their disposal, no legal rule can lead them to a
rational conclusion.”166 He thus concluded that efforts in this regard were
doomed to failure – and thus, beyond a very limited extent, not worth
pursuing in the first place.167
162
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This vision of government inadequacy ultimately led Bok to envision
a much more limited role for the NLRB in regulating representation
campaigns. If employees are doomed to irrational choices, why spend
time and money in an effort to establish pristine laboratory conditions?
There is a contradiction here, which Bok recognized at various points in
the paper: if such decisions are based on irrational factors, then even more
of an effort should be made to remove improper or misleading campaign
activities that may sway an employee’s final decision.168 But Bok
believed that the factors that compel most employees’ decisions are
established at the onset of the campaign, if not before.169 Thus, he
ultimately sees the campaign as unimportant, and campaign regulation as
a procedural hurdle to be minimized.170 Ultimately, it is the goal of
administrative efficiency that Bok set as his polestar for his inquiry.
Although Bok thus rejected overall efforts to improve the rationality
of employee choice, he did use the argument to support policy changes
when such changes also would improve administrative efficiency. In
arguing that inflammatory speech should not be regulated, Bok cited to a
psychological study finding that calm and rational arguments were more
persuasive than emotional entreaties.171 Bok lauded the informational
value of employer predictions about high dues and frequent strikes,
noting “[t]he costs that might result from strikes and dues payments are
clearly legitimate factors to be weighed by employees.”172 Similarly, Bok
argued that employers should be free to grant benefits to employees in the
midst of a campaign, not only because rational employees can discount
the effect of such “bribes,” but also because such conduct provides
further information about the two alternatives open to employees.173
Even misrepresentations or misleading remarks need not be policed if the
other side is given an adequate opportunity to respond, thus increasing the
168
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information available to employees.174 In this vein, Bok also noted a
union’s lack of access to names and addresses as an obstacle in the
process, and argued that the employer should be required to provide such
information once the bargaining unit had been determined.175
In the end, Bok’s perspective offers a complicated and, I venture,
contradictory set of perspectives and policy suggestions on the NLRB’s
regulation of the union representation election. He seemed to recognize
the need to strong efforts against employer reprisals, noting in the
conclusion that “an elemental fear of reprisal still poses the major threat
to the free and fair elections contemplated by the act.”176 However, Bok
was fairly nihilistic about efforts to truly effectuate rational employee
choice, and his main concern is instead cutting down on bureaucratic
interventions that delay the ultimate disposition of the election. Although
such a viewpoint supports his policy recommendations, it was hard for
Bok to completely retreat from a rational actor model, and he ended up
falling back onto it for support. In the end, Bok’s prescription is
superficially compelling but somewhat incoherent: he advocates a drastic
cutback in regulation but seems unwilling to acknowledge any
detrimental effects to such a cutback.
Twelve years later, Bok would write the forward to Union
Representation Elections: Law and Reality by Julius Getman, Stephen
Goldberg, and Jeanne Herman. The book essentially summarized a largescale empirical investigation into the decisions made during a union
representation election. Putting the book into context, Bok wrote:
Earlier writers had seriously questioned the government’s
policy of establishing detailed election rules to protect
employee free choice from a long list of questionable
campaign practices . . . . What Getman, Goldberg, and
Herman have done is investigate the voting behavior of
employees in a large number of elections to determine
whether the Labor Board rules are really needed to
guarantee a free and uncoerced choice. Unlike many
empirical studies, their work arrives at clearcut conclusions
174
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that make a massive attack on the assumptions that support
an entire body of regulatory law.177
The Getman et al. study did what Bok claimed it did: namely, provide
an argument based on empirical data against most of the Board’s
regulation of the representation campaign. The book begins by noting
that the Board bases its regulation on assumptions about human behavior
untested by research. The authors note that the Board’s model of voting
behavior is based on the “free and reasoned choice” approach, and then
provides a list of behavioral “assumptions” the Board makes about
employees: they are attentive to the campaign, they will interpret
ambiguous statements by the employer as threats or promises, they are
unsophisticated about labor relations, their free choice is fragile, and that
the decision to sign or not sign a representation card is representative of
employee support for the union.178 The purpose of the Getman et al.
study was to test these assumptions against data taken from actual
representation elections.
In a study remarkable for its breadth as well as for the administrative
hurdles it overcame, the authors examined thirty-one union representation
elections between 1972 and 1973.179 The authors orchestrated interviews
of 1,239 employees who participated in these elections.180 The interviews
were conducted in two waves; first, as soon as possible after the NLRB
directed an election to take place, and then again after the election.181 In
the first wave, interviewers sought to assess the employee’s pre-campaign
sentiments about union representation, their own working conditions, and
how they intended to vote.182 In the second wave, employees were asked
how and why they voted as well as what they remembered from the
representation campaign.183 The authors then analyzed the results to

177

GETMAN ET AL., supra note JG1, at xi.
Id. at 7-21.
179
Id. at 33. In order to get employees’ names and contact information for use in the
study, the authors had to file a Freedom of Information Act claim against the Board. Id.
at 36-37. The Board refused to provide the information until compelled by the United
States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit. Id.
180
Id. at 33.
181
Id.
182
Id.
183
Id.
178

33

INFORMATION & REPRESENTATION ELECTIONS

determine what factors went into employees’ voting decisions, including
the effects of employer and union campaign efforts.
The headline for the study is that the votes of 81 percent of the
employees could be predicted from their pre-campaign attitudes about
their job and about unions.184 The study also found that employees who
had an intent to vote a particular way prior to the campaign generally
ended up voting that way: 94 percent of employees intending to vote for
the company did so, as did 82 percent of those intending to vote for the
union.185 The authors were able to predict the outcome of 29 out of the
31 elections based on how employees intended to vote.186 According to
Getman and his coauthors, these results disprove the Board’s assumption
that free choice is fragile and employees will be easily influenced by the
campaign. However, the authors also admit that 19 percent of employees
were initially undecided (six percent) or voted contrary to their original
intent (13 percent), and that the votes of this 19 percent were necessary
for victory in nine out of the 31 elections.187 Of these groups, 76 percent
of the switchers and 68 percent of the undecided voters ended up voting
for the company.188
Getman, Goldberg, and Herman also studied to what extent
employees could remember aspects of the union’s and employer’s
campaigns and the salience of campaign issues to the employee vote.
According to their study, employees recalled an average of three
company campaign issues and two to three union campaign issues at the
end of the campaign.189 Since the authors determined that there were
around 25 to 30 issues each in the union and employer campaigns, they
concluded that the roughly 10 percent recognition percentage displayed a
“low level of familiarity” with the campaign process.190 Ten of the issues
raised by companies had a 20 percent or higher recognition rate, but none
had higher than 40 percent.191 The most recognized issue was
“improvement not dependent on unionization,” followed by “new
company/management recently taken over” and “plant closing/moving
184
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may follow unionization.”192 Union issues fared substantially better at
the top: “wages unsatisfactory; union will improve” was recognized by 71
percent of employees, while 64 percent recognized “union will prevent
unfairness, set up grievance procedure/seniority system.”193 However,
only six of the twenty-five union issues were recognized by more than 20
percent of respondents.194
Getman and his coauthors also found that several factors
corresponded with campaign familiarity. Union supporters were
generally more informed about both campaigns. More union voters (47
percent) reported employer discussion of the potential for job loss
stemming from a union victory than company workers (24 percent).195
Union supporters were also much more likely to attend union meetings,
and such attendance was strongly correlated with familiarity.196
However, 83 percent of employees attended company meetings, while
only 36 percent of employees attended union meetings.197 Exposure to
written campaign material also contributed significantly to familiarity;
employees who received campaign literature recalled roughly double the
number of issues than those who did not.198
The study also found a high correspondence between reasons for the
employees’ votes and campaign issues in those elections. According to
the study, 84 percent of the reasons given by union voters and 71 percent
of the reasons given by voters against the union were issues raised in the
preceding campaign.199 However, the authors found no corresponding
relationship between election success and campaign characteristics.200
The study did find that the subset of employees who switched their votes
from intending to vote for the company to a union vote, or who went from
undecided to a union vote, recalled significantly more about the union
campaign.201 The authors believed that this result was explained by the
high level of attendance at union meetings by employees in these
192
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groups.202 However, the authors could not determine the causal
relationship between switch, familiarity, and attendance at union
meetings.203 Undecideds and switchers who voted for the company were
not significantly more familiar with the company’s campaign.204
The authors also specifically examined the effects of unlawful
employer campaigning on representation election results. The study
found that employers had engaged in unlawful campaigning in 22 out of
the 31 elections.205 In nine of those elections, the employer committed
campaign violations serious enough to warrant a bargaining order.206
Despite this high level of misconduct, however, the study found generally
no correlation between voting behavior and this illegal activity. While
noting that employees who signed union cards did in fact vote in
significantly higher numbers against the union in elections marred by
unlawful campaigning, the authors detected no such effects on employees
who were undecided, employees who intended to vote for the union, or
employees whose prior attitudes predicted a union vote.207 Even the
firing of union supporters did not result in a significant change in voting
behavior.208
Based on these results, Getman, Goldberg, and Herman argued for a
serious overhaul in the Board’s regulation of representation campaigns.
Since 81 percent of employees voted according to their pre-election
attitudes about working conditions and unions, the authors believed that
the importance of the pre-elections campaign was seriously overblown.
This conclusions was supported by the authors’ findings that employees
remembered only a small percentage of issues from the campaign and,
therefore, were “not generally attentive to the campaign.”209
Interestingly, they state the following about employee “rationality” with
regard to the campaign:
The fact that employees do not pay close attention to the
campaign does not mean that the voting decision is
202
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irrational. An employee who votes consistently with his
pre-campaign attitudes is acting in a wholly rational
manner. His choice, to be sure, may not be reasoned in the
sense in which the Board contemplates – based on a careful
weighing of the campaign arguments put forth by each
party – but that does not make it any less rational.210
The authors are thus largely in the “predestination” camp: the
campaign will not affect the way most voters vote. Even employer
attempts at coercion seem to have no effect on voting patterns. Given
these findings, the authors argue that the Board should drastically cut
back on its regulation of representation elections. Campaign speech,
according to the authors, “should be as free of governmental restrain as
speech in political elections.”211 As the authors note, “[b]oth the
employee voter and the political voter appear less interested in the
campaign than traditional theory would have it, but that, if anything,
suggests less need for governmental regulation of speech, not more.”212
Grants of benefits should be allowed.213 Bargaining orders should be
rare, as the election result, even if tainted, is likely to reflect the wishes of
employees.214 However, the authors do depart from this “hands-off”
model in several instances. Even the authors cannot fully ascribe to their
findings that severe employer illegality has little effect on campaigns.
They recommend harsher penalties, such as treble damages, for illegal
discharges during the campaign.215 And they argue in favor of equal
opportunities for unions and employers to address the workers during
work time on employer premises. Noting the employer’s significant
advantage in communicating with employees, the authors argue that “an
employer who holds campaign meetings on working time and premises
should be required to allow the union (or unions) to hold such meetings
on working time and premises.”216 Comparing the election again to the
political process, the authors state: “It is fundamental to the democratic
210
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process that each party should have a roughly equal opportunity to
communicate with the electorate, regardless of the effectiveness of that
communication.”217 The authors similarly praise the Board’s Exclesior
requirements for their facilitation of access.218
Getman, Goldberg, and Herman’s study was primarily criticized for
its failure to blame employer coercion for the decreasing rate of privateemployee unionization.219 As commentators pointed out, many of the
statistics heralded by the authors as proof of campaign irrelevance could
be read much more ambiguously.220 In fact, according to one reading of
the study’s data, the study shows that unions would have won 46% to
47% of elections if they had been entirely free from illegal behavior, and
3% to 10% if the employers had campaigned at the highest level of
illegality shown in the study.221 However, as will be discussed below,
these critics do not generally quarrel with the study’s efforts to minimize
the length or importance of the campaign. Although the Board initially
relied on the study in changing its misrepresentation jurisprudence in
Shopping Kart, the Board later rejected these findings when it reversed
course in General Knit.222 When the Board subsequently changed back to
the Shopping Kart rule, it failed to cite the study as grounds for doing
so.223 Recent efforts to use the study before the Board have not met with
success.224
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B. The Problem of Employer Coercion: Paul Weiler and Craig Becker
Paul Weiler came to Harvard Law School in 1981 after extensive
experience with the Canadian system of labor relations.225 In a
groundbreaking series of articles, Weiler argued for a new framework for
U.S. labor law, based primarily on the Canadian model.226 In his first
article, Weiler developed an alternative model for the certification of
unions as collective employee representatives.227
Weiler’s central premise was that the steady decline in union
representation results (at least in substantial part) from a marked increase
in employer coercion and illegal tactics directed at union campaigns and
supporters. To prove this point, Weiler relied on statistics about two
general trends. First, Weiler noted that the rate of union victories in
representation campaigns dropped from 74% in 1950 to 48% in 1980.228
At the same time, the number of unfair labor practice claims filed against
employers rose from 4,472 in 1950 to 31,281 in 1980, with the percentage
of meritorious claims rising slightly.229 Putting these two trends together,
Weiler argued that the decrease in union representation is correlated with
the increase in employer unfair labor practices. For further proof, Weiler
compared the U.S. data with Canadian data, which had roughly three
times the rate of increasing union density from new union certifications,
as well as one-sixth the number of discriminatory discharge complaints
per election.230
Weiler blamed the increasing influence of employer coercion for the
declining rates of U.S. unionization. According to Weiler, weak remedies
for unfair labor practices, combined with lengthy delays in the
General Knit), overruled in part on different grounds by Overnite Transp. Co. v. NLRB,
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representation and remediation process, encouraged an atmosphere of
employer coercion and lawbreaking. In order to stem the tide of this
illegal campaigning, Weiler argued not for greater penalties, but instead
for the elimination of the campaign process itself. Instead of a two-month
campaign between initial filing and actual election, Weiler advocated for
an “instant” (five days or less) election.231 Such a brief period would
prevent employers from sustaining prolonged campaign offenses replete
with unfair labor practices and other tactics of intimidation.232
Weiler acknowledged that the purpose of a union representation
system is “to nurture and protect employee freedom of choice with
respect to collective bargaining.”233 However, Weiler argued that the
U.S. model overplays the significance of the union to employees by
treating the union as “a quasi-governmental authority over the
employees.”234 By allowing the employer to participation in the
campaign during a substantial period of time, the NLRA had in effect
stated that “the employer is legitimately entitled to play the same role in a
representation campaign against the union that the Republican Party plays
in a political campaign against the Democrats.”235 As Weiler argued, this
is strange – the union is seeking to represent employees in their
relationship with the employer, in a context in which employees and
employers often have adverse interests.236 A more apt analogy, according
to Weiler, would be allowing foreign governments to have a role in our
political campaigns.237 If anything, this is too weak; perhaps a better
analogy would be allowing your spouse to have a say in who you hire as
your divorce attorney.
Weiler did recognize “one final defense” for proponents of the current
system: namely, the election campaign as “an aid to informed employee
choice.”238 The employer serves as a proxy supporter for those
employees who do not support the union and provides them with
resources, arguments, and organization.239 Weiler was not persuaded,
231
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however, based on his analysis of the costs and benefits to such a system.
He believed that the employer had a fair opportunity to make its case
prior to the representation election; that U.S. workers were not
unsophisticated about unions; and that employers would have a chance to
make their case about working conditions during negotiations with the
union.240 Weiler concluded: “The contribution made by the election
campaign to the enlightenment of the employees is marginal at best.”241
In 1993, Craig Becker built upon Weiler’s criticism of the political
model for union representation campaigns. According to Becker, the
conception of the union election as a contest between employer and
unions had “subverted labor’s right to representation.”242 Employers
were not competing against unions in a neutral election, but rather
attempting to influence an election in an arena where they help ultimate
power.243 Delving into Wagner Act legislative history as well as early
Board decisions, Becker developed how the democratic political
campaign had become the “legitimating metaphor” for the Wagner Act
and collective bargaining more generally.244 However, early Board
decisions had not required a secret-ballot election in determining
representation and, more importantly, had held that the employer had no
role to play in the campaign process.245 It was not until the Supreme
Court and the Taft-Hartley Act intervened that the Board was required to
have secret-ballot elections and provide the employer with the right to
present its case, as long as it made no threats or bribes.246
Once the electoral model was imposed on the representation
campaign, the Board’s regulation of the process vacillated between a
laissez-faire political model and the much stricter laboratory conditions
model.247 The laboratory conditions model is thus seen as a response to
the employer’s new role: in order to restrain the effects of employer
participation, the Board needed to lay down strict requirements on
electioneering. The contradiction between laboratory conditions and
240
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political democracy, however, is manifest. Commentators have criticized
Board regulations based on the dissonance between these concepts.248
But as Becker pointed out, the political analogy itself is inapt. The
answer, according to Becker, is not to embrace the freewheeling
regulation of the political model, as suggested by Bok and Getman et al.,
but rather to get rid of the political analogy and its trappings.249 Becker’s
prescription is to strip employers of “any legally cognizable interest in
their employees’ election of representatives.”250
What exactly would this mean? Becker did not propose that
employers must remain neutral during representation campaigns. Instead,
he argued that employers should not have any official role in the election
process. Thus, employers would have no grounds to contest the unit or
otherwise participate in representation hearings.251 Employers would not
have the right to challenge elections or voters, and thus would not have
the right to place observers at the polls.252 More generally, campaign
rules would attempt to prevent employers from “exploiting their singular
economic power to persuade employees.”253 Thus, employers would not
be permitted to host any “captive audience” campaign presentations.254
They would be bound to follow the rules on solicitation and distribution
that they laid down for union representatives.255 Although Becker’s
proposal thus seems to allow for employer speech as long as similar
opportunities are offered to the union, he did state that “[i]t is but a short
step to the realization that all employer speech to employees during
working hours, at the workplace, is speech to a captive audience.”256
Becker’s rhetoric is firmly set against any participation by the
employer in representation campaigns. But his proposed solution allows
employers to continue to have a role in the election process, albeit a nonlegally-sanctioned one. It is not clear why, if employers have no
legitimate interests in the process, Becker was not willing to return to the
Board’s prior employer-neutrality requirement. Perhaps his proposal is
248
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based primarily on practical considerations, since he emphasized that it
could be achieved “with almost no alteration of the statutory
framework.”257 But it seems unrealistic to expect that employers will
have a substantially reduced role in the campaign merely because they
can no longer officially intervene.
I believe that Becker may have been hung up by the same concerns
that befuddled Bok as well as Getman. While acknowledging the
disfunctionality of the election process, these commentators seem
reluctant to completely eliminate the representation campaign. Even
though Becker persuasively deconstructed the political electioneering
model as applied in this context, he could not quite argue for a wholesale
elimination of it. Perhaps Becker was merely working within what he felt
were the politically realistic constraints at the time. But Becker’s reforms
recognize, despite his rhetoric, that the employer may in fact have a
continuing role to play within the campaign. It is hard to reconcile this
continuing role based on the powerful problems, as he and Paul Weiler
set forth, caused by continued engagement.
C. Past Reforms and the Problem of the Rational Actor
As discussed above, there have been two distinct reformist
approaches to the union representation election. The Bok-Getman
approach believes that the NLRB has swamped the process with a flood
of complicated regulations. Believing that most employees have already
made up their minds, they place little stock in the pre-election campaign.
Although they acknowledge that employer coercion may have ill effects
on pro-union sentiment, they argue that overall the effects are not that
important. Their reforms focus on cutting down the red tape that
entangles the post-election process, in order to secure election results
more quickly and enable participants to settle in to the post-election
reality. The Weiler-Becker approach, on the other hand, believes that the
effects of employer coercion and disapproval during the election
campaign are incredibly important. They argue that employer
participation in representation campaigns allows employers to cow their
employees through legal and illegal means. By using coercion, threats,
and even simple disapproval, employers can significantly reduce
employee support and enthusiasm for union representation, resulting in
257

Id. at 585.

43

INFORMATION & REPRESENTATION ELECTIONS

fizzled campaigns and lost elections. Weiler and Becker both
acknowledge a role for the representation campaign, but they believe that
employers’ roles in those campaigns should be greatly reduced or even
eliminated.
Both camps would find some grounds for agreement with each other.
Weiler and Becker would surely agree that the potentially lengthy postelection process, where employers can delay a union victory by raising
and litigation objections and challenges, should be shortened. And Bok
and Getman et al. acknowledge that employer coercion can improperly
interfere with the election process. But I think they also are both missing
perhaps the most important issue in a representation campaign – namely,
whether union representation is an economically rational choice for the
employees making the selection. The Bok-Getman approach places little
emphasis on this question, believing that employees will either base their
decisions on irrational whims, hunches, or prejudices258 and/or are
programmed well before a particular campaign to either accept or reject
the union’s offer.259 They thus discount the usefulness of the
representation campaign in providing information to employees about the
costs and benefits of unionization. Weiler and Becker, on the other hand,
seem to believe that employees have all of the information they need once
they have signed authorization cards. They discount the negative
information about the union that employers may provide, and instead
believe that employees have gotten all of the information they need to
know before the campaign. However, they spend little time analyzing
this process, and I suspect that they believe unionization would be in the
interests of almost any employee out there.
As will be discussed further below, I agree that reforms should limit
the delays caused by post-election challenges, and should try to curtail the
effects of employee coercion. However, I also believe that the two
approaches discussed above have overlooked the role of the campaign in
providing critical information to employees about the costs and benefits
of the unionization decision. Providing this information is the real
purpose of the representation campaign and election, and the two prior
reformist programs have paid little attention to this purpose. In the
section that follows, I will discuss how Congress and the Securities and
Exchange Commission have taken a very different approach to managing
258
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information in the context of the securities markets. In that context,
regulation has been almost entirely focused on providing the right
information to potential consumers. From that discussion, I then will
endeavor to show why steps towards information disclosure in the market
for labor representation have an even stronger normative basis.
PART III: THE CASE FOR REQUIRED DISCLOSURE IN THE UNION
REPRESENTATION CAMPAIGN
A. Information and Rational Contracting
Rational decisions to exchange goods or services – in other words,
trade – are the key mechanisms to improving our individual and societal
welfare.260 Contracts are the legal mechanism for enforcing trades in our
economic system. According to economic theory, contracts should be
enforced because of their Pareto optimality: they increase the utility of all
of the parties to the exchange.261 Of course, there can be contractual
winners and losers; many contracts are about hedging risk, and one party
ends up bearing the risk. But when the contract is created, both parties
agree to it (per economic doctrine) because they believe it increases their
net present utility.
However, for contractual exchanges to be Pareto optimal, they
must be made using the proper data, or “perfect information” in economic
parlance.262 If the data is faulty, the results will be faulty, no matter how
260
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logical the decisionmaker.263 To what extent do we simply trust parties to
gather information for themselves? Given its importance to the
bargaining context, information material to the transaction must at a
minimum be protected from false or deceptive misinformation. In some
cases, however, the parties – either individually or together – will be
unable to generate the necessary levels of information.
The common law of contract has long struggled with how to manage
information in the bargaining process. From the beginning courts have
prohibited fraud – i.e., misrepresentations about information material to
the contract. However, the definition of “fraud” has long extended to
omissions in disclosure as well as affirmative misrepresentations, as the
famous case of Laidlaw v. Organ264 attests. Many scholars have
attempted to provide a theoretical basis for determining when parties to a
contract negotiation have a duty to disclose material information.265
Although one might say that, in the absence of a fiduciary relationship,
there is no common law requirement to disclose, this is an
overstatement.266 In fact, in a number of instances, courts have required
parties to disclose information, or they will risk rescission or even
liability for fraud.267
To a large extent, however, the common law of contractual disclosure
has been superseded by a variety of statutory schemes that endeavor to
regulate information in the context of particular markets. Consumer
protection laws focus in part on providing information about critical
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aspects of the product.268 The Food & Drug Administration requires
extensive labeling on prepackaged food products in order to inform the
public about ingredients, calories, and fat content.269 The Truth in
Lending Act requires the disclosure of interest rates in understandable
terms. 270 The primary purpose of these statutes is to empower the
consumer to make efficient decisions by having the proper information.271
Perhaps the most comprehensive scheme of contractual regulation is
the federal system of securities regulation. Even before the New Deal,
state blue sky laws placed special restrictions on the sale of securities
beyond the common law.272 The Securities Act of 1933273 and the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934274 then completely reshaped the playing
field. They put into place a comprehensive federal system premised on
antifraud protection and a process of mandatory disclosure. This scheme,
while fleshed out though seventy years of amendment, regulation, and
judicial opinion, retains relatively the same structure with which it began.
268

For example, the federal Moss-Magnuson Warranty Act requires disclosure about
warranties on consumer products. See Joan Vogel, Squeezing Consumers: Lemon Laws,
Consumer Warranties, and a Proposal for Reform, 1985 ARIZ. ST. L. J. 589, 610 (“The
basic goal of the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act is to improve the warranty information
available to consumers by providing for full disclosure of all written warranty terms in a
clear and concise manner.”).
269
See 21 U.S.C. §§ 371(a), 393(b)(2)(A) (2000); 21 C.F.R. § 101.9 (2005); U.S. Food
and Drug Administration, What FDA Regulates, at
http://www.fda.gov/comments/regs.html (last visited Sept. 26, 2005). For discussion of
a particular change in the regulations, see Food & Drug Admin., Food Labeling: Trans
Fatty Acids in Nutrition Labeling, Nutrient Content Claims, and Health Claims, 68 Fed.
Reg. 41434 (July 11, 2003).
270
Peterson, supra note CP1, at 880 (“The most important requirements of the Truth in
Lending provisions centered around the disclosure of the cost of credit based on standard
uniform requirements set out by the act and by the Federal Reserve Board.”). See also
Matthew A. Edwards, Empirical and Behavioral Critiques of Mandatory Disclosure:
Socio-Economics and the Quest for Truth in Lending, 14 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y
199 (2005).
271
See, e.g., Peterson, supra note CP1, at 883 (“Unlike interest rate caps and other
control devices, disclosure regulation – at least in theory – increases the freedom of
consumers through giving the opportunity to open one's own eyes. With a uniform
method of learning the costs and characteristics of credit contracts, debtors can
determine which credit contracts are in their best interests.”).
272
See Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Origin of the Blue Sky Laws, 70 TEX.
L. REV. 347, 348 (1991).
273
15 U.S.C. §§ 77a – 77aa (2000).
274
15 U.S.C. §§ 78a – 78mm (2000).

47

INFORMATION & REPRESENTATION ELECTIONS

The disclosure requirements mandated by federal regulation are
considerably broad. In the context of an initial offering, § 5 of the 1993
Act requires that issuers file a comprehensive registration statement with
the Securities and Exchange Commission.275 Section 7 of the 1933 Act,
along with Schedule A, sets forth the basics of the disclosure
requirements and also empowers the Commission to establish further
disclosure regulations.276 Schedule A sets forth thirty-tw
o separate
provisions of disclosure, including the issuer’s articles of incorporation or
other structural documents,277 the general character of the issuer’s
business,278 the amount of outstanding debt,279 remuneration paid to
directors and officers,280 the security’s price (or method of calculating the
price),281 items relating to possible conflicts of interest,282 a detailed
balance sheet,283 and a profit and loss statement.284 The Commission has
further refined these requirements through a series of forms and further
regulations. The Commission’s forms break down what information must
merely be disclosed to the Commission and what information must also
be provided in the prospectus, a document provided to potential
purchasers.285 However, these forms generally refer to Regulation S-K to
define what exactly must be provided. Regulation S-K is significantly
more detailed than Schedule A, detailing precisely what types of
quantitative and qualitative information must be disclosed.286 For
example, Regulation S-K has extremely detailed requirements on the
disclosure of financial information,287 including a special provision on
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management’s discussion and analysis of the firm’s financial condition
and results of its operations.288
In the context of a securities offering, federal law integrates the
required disclosure within an overall process of restrictions on
information dissemination. Section 5(c) of the 1933 Act prohibits all
offers to sell the securities prior to the filing of the registration
statement.289 However, the Commission has given an extremely broad
definition to the term “offer,” holding that any communication reasonably
calculated to generate a buying interest is an offer.290 After the
registration materials have been filed, the issue enters the “waiting
period” until the Commission has made the registration statement
effective. Offers to sell made during the waiting period must generally
also provide all of the information required in the prospectus.291 Since
some of this information may not be available until the offering price has
been set, it may be impossible to furnish the required prospectus during
the waiting period.292 The Commission thus has made a limited
exception to this Catch-22 by allowing “tombstone ads”293 and
preliminary “red herring” prospectuses.294 Once the waiting period has
ended, all written offers for sale must be accompanied by a complete
prospectus.295
Although quite complicated, the registration process is designed to
accomplish three primary purposes: (1) make material information about
the issuer public, (2) require the issuer to deliver some of that information
to potential investors (through the prospectus), and (3) restrict the issuer’s
opportunities to promote its securities outside of these channels. It does
not seem a stretch to say that the 1933 Act, and by extension the
Commission, are endeavoring to create “laboratory conditions” for the
288
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sales of securities. They are trying to get material information to the
consumer, and at the same time they are limiting opportunities for
purchase without such information.
In contrast to the 1933 Act’s focus on a security’s initial sale, the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 regulates the sales of securities after
they have been issued and are traded on the open market. The 1934 Act
establishes a registration and supervision system for national securities
exchanges296 and requires continuing disclosure for companies whose
securities trade on those markets.297 The mandatory disclosure comes in
the form of periodic reports: Form 10-K, an annual report; Form 10-Q, a
quarterly report, and Form 8-K, an interim report required in limited
circumstances.298 The 1934 Act also regulates brokers, members, and
dealers of the exchanges,299 and imposes certain requirements with
respect to proxy solicitations and tender offers.300 The SEC also enacted
Rule 10b-5, its comprehensive antifraud provision, under § 10 of the 1934
Act.
A survey of every context in which contractual disclosure is required
is beyond the scope of this article.301 What follows instead is an
argument for mandatory disclosure in the union representation context.
More specifics about the content and extent of this disclosure will be
discussed in Part VII. In this Part, I will discuss more generally the
information failures in the market for union representation that would
296
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require mandated disclosure. In so doing, I will rely heavily on
discussions about required disclosure in the securities markets, based on
the comprehensiveness of that scheme and the deep theoretical literature
surrounding it.
B. Arguments for Required Disclosure in the Union Representation
Campaign
1. Union representation and the problem of information asymmetry.
As noted above, the basic common law contractual paradigm assumes
that parties to a contract will obtain their own information. Although the
common law prohibits fraud and requires truthful disclosure in response
to questioning, there is no general duty to disclose information. The set
of cases that usually come to mind are those involving some hidden cost
or benefit that has been discovered, at some cost, by one of the parties.
Requiring disclosure of this information will dampen the incentive to find
this information in the first place, and thus society will have less
information and will be worse off.302
Moreover, in most cases the market will provide incentives for
participants to disclose information voluntarily. Consumers will not buy
a product unless they know something about it. If a seller fails to disclose
sufficient information, consumers will demand the information; those
sellers that provide it will sell more products. We need information to get
us interested in contracting in the first place. Of course, advertising is to
some extent hype and persuasion, but it is also information. Sellers have
an incentive to provide enough information so that buyers can identify
their product and judge for themselves whether they want the product and
at what cost.
Of course, it may be possible for a market to fail to provide such
information on its own. For reasons discussed further below, the market
participants have incentives to reveal insufficient information about the
product, thus leading eventually to a failure of the market. One of the
most famous examples of such a situation is the market for used cars as
modeled by George Akerlof in The Market for “Lemons”. 303 As
described by Akerlof, the sellers of used cars have much more
information about the true quality of the car than do sellers. Moreover, it
302
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is difficult to correct this information asymmetry, given the inability of
most buyers to determine quality or to trust a seller’s purported
information disclosure. Under Akelof’s model, buyers will be forced to
assume that a used car is a “lemon” and thus will only offer to pay the
value of a lemon, regardless of the car’s actual quality. Those with
quality used cars will thus elect to keep their cars rather than sell them at
a drastically reduced value, leaving only those with actual lemons in the
market. Akerlof thus predicts that a downward spiral may result, in
which “it is quite possible to have the bad driving out the not-so-bad
driving out the medium driving out the no-so-good driving out the good
in such a sequence of events that no market exists at all.”304
The “market for lemons” problem is not confined to used cars. As
Bernard Black has pointed out, securities markets are a “vivid example”
of Akerlof’s market for lemons; “[i]ndeed, they are a far more vivid
example than [the] original example of used cars.”305 Black explains:
Used car buyers can observe the car, take a test drive, have
a mechanic inspect the car, and ask others about their
experiences with the same car model or manufacturer. By
comparison, a company’s shares, when the company first
goes public, are like an unobservable car, produced by an
unknown manufacturer, on which investors can obtain only
dry, written information that they can’t directly verify.306
If investors cannot verify the information they receive about a security,
the market is ripe for exploitation. Knowing this, investors will treat
every security as if they cannot trust the underlying facts about it. This
underpricing will drive the higher quality issuers out of the market,
leading to Akerlof’s downward spiral which completely destroys the
market.
Why is information so crucial to the securities markets? A security,
particularly corporate shares, represents a property right in something that
exists only as a fictional person, created through documents filed in a
particular state. Shareholders generally do not run the business; they
304
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contribute capital so that others may run a profitable business and pay the
shareholders the residual. A shareholder trusts the people who run the
corporation – officers and directors – to act as their representatives in
running the corporation so as to maximize shareholder value.307
Although shareholders elect the board of directors, who in turn appoint
the officers who run the corporation, this power is very difficult to
exercise in a large corporation. Thus, shareholders must be able to trust
directors and officers to use their money appropriately. There is a very
real “agency costs” concern that lies at the heart of much corporate law
today.308
Are unions subject to the “market for lemons” problem? Upon
examination, they are subject to agency cost concerns similar to those of
corporate shareholders. Union members trust that their union dues will
be used by union officials to get them the best terms and conditions of
employment possible. And similar to shareholders, union members have
the right to elect these officials, although that power is similarly
attenuated, especially at the national level.309
Union representation services also have the more general information
asymmetries that contribute to a “market for lemons.” Unions provide
services that are not transparent; they are not easy to judge before
purchase.310 The union promises to improve the employees’ terms and
conditions of employment. How much better will the terms and
conditions be? Will the negotiations proceed easily, or must a painful
strike be endured? How effective will the union be in representing
employees in grievance arbitrations? Are union officials paid the
appropriate amount, or are they overpaid? Would they properly manage
my retirement? It is very difficult to know ahead of time what the union
307

Directors are not strictly agents of the corporation; they are in fact more akin to
elected representatives. See, e.g., Automatic Self-Cleansing Filter Syndicate Co., Ltd. v.
Cunninghame, 2 Ch. 34 (Eng. C.A. 1906) (establishing the right of directors to act
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Continental Securities Co. v. Belmont, 206 N.Y. 7, 16 (1912) (“[T]he directors are not
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Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial
Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976).
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dues will buy.311 In addition, union services cannot be trial-tested before
purchasing them. It takes a very costly and time consuming process and
agreement by a majority of employees to purchase union representation
services. And as will be discussed below,312 once those services have
been purchased, it is very difficult to get out of them.
The Getman, Goldberg, and Herman study indicated that many
workers made their union election decisions based on previous
experiences with union membership.313 But as the number of unionized
private employees continues to decline, fewer workers have such
experiences to draw on. In voting for union representation, employees
must make a leap of faith: that the money they pay to the union will be
used to better their terms and conditions of employment, rather than
leaving them the same or even making them worse. Like the decision to
buy a stock, the purchaser needs lots of information about the
organization in order to determine whether the benefits of such a decision
outweigh the costs.
But even if employees cannot easily get the necessary information by
looking at the product or from past experience, won’t union and
employers provide the necessary information themselves? As discussed
next, there are reasons to believe that the information will not be properly
conveyed.
2. The current market for union representation is poorly constructed to
deliver information to potential customers.
The market for union representation services is constructed as an
election. Employees obtain representation services by voting for such
services through a secret ballot election conducted by the Board. As
noted earlier,314 the pre-election process is often analogized to a political
campaign in which the union and the employer are running against each
other. In a traditional political campaign, the parties to the election are
311

The problem applies even after employees have joined the union. See id. at 379-80
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expected to generate all the necessary information for voters to make their
decision. Each candidate has an incentive to point out his or her positive
features, as well as his or her opponent’s negative features. Given these
incentives, the voters can expect to get all positive and negative
information about the candidates from the candidates’ pre-election
campaigns.315
In a union representation campaign, the union is seeking, through an
election, to represent a group of the employer’s workers. The union thus
has incentives to present itself in a positive light. Like any seller of
services, the union is trying to persuade its potential customers that they
should purchase its services.316 Union representatives may use a variety
of sales techniques that have been passed down through the centuries.
But their incentives are to get employees to sign up with the union.
In so doing, a union also has incentives to portray the employer in a
negative light. After all, the union’s services are simply group
representation of employees in their negotiations with employers over the
employment contract. The union must therefore convince employees that
the employer is not giving them the best terms and conditions that it
could. If a union cannot improve the employees’ lot, there is no need for
its services. So the union must convince employees that the union could
negotiate on the employees’ behalf to get a better deal. In making this
case, the union may bring out information about the employer that may
seem negative to employees. For example, the union may argue that the
employer’s profit margins are extremely high. The union may argue that
the employer is paying employees much less than other companies in the
315

Thus, much of the debate surrounding campaign reform has been whether parties
have sufficient funds to get their message out. Those in favor of campaign finance
reforms generally believe that a combination of federal campaign funding and
limitations on private donations are necessary to enable a level informational playing
field. See, e.g., Dennis F. Thompson, Two Concepts of Corruption: Making Campaigns
Safe for Democracy, 73 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1036, 1047 (2005) (“[E]lectoral corruption
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However, critics believe that limitations of private campaign spending restrict free
speech and curtail the flow of information. See, e.g., Bradley A. Smith, Faulty
Assumptions and Undemocratic Consequences of Campaign Finance Reform, 105 YALE
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communications).
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501, 515 (discussing the market for union representation services).

55

INFORMATION & REPRESENTATION ELECTIONS

field pay their workers. The crux of the case is that the employer is
holding back, and the employees need the union to maximize their
contractual benefits.
As Craig Becker has pointed out, the employer is in some respects a
third party to this transaction.317 Whether I hire Jim to represent me in
my negotiations with Earl is really no business of Earl’s. But of course
the employer often will have a strong interest in seeing the union’s
election petition defeated. Union representation may very well mean
higher wages and better benefits for employees. It means extensive
bargaining sessions with the union over the contract.318 If the parties
agree to a contract, the employer must inform the union of any future
changes in working conditions and then bargain over those as well.319 If
the parties do not agree to a contract, the employer may face a strike or
unfair labor practice charges for failure to bargain in good faith. For an
employer looking to preserve the contractual status quo as well as its
ability to act independently with regard to employees, such an employer
has a very strong interest in seeing the union defeated.
In such cases the employer will have incentives to disseminate
negative information about the union. Of course, what is negative to the
employer – i.e., the potential for higher wages – is not a negative for the
employees. So the employer will also have the incentive to find out and
disseminate information about the union that is negative from an
employee’s perspective. For example, information about the union’s past
ineffectiveness, its wastefulness of union funds, and its inability to live up
to its campaign promises are all useful to the anti-union employer in
dissuading employees from voting for the union. The employer will also
have incentives to paint itself in a positive light. The employer will want
to show that it is giving its employees the best deal it can, and that the
union will not be able to get any further concessions from the employer.
However, the previous discussion assumes an employer that does not
want union representation. Although all employers have some incentives
to avoid unionization, due to the added time and expense imposed by
bargaining, employers who have the most incentive to defeat the union
are those who have the most to lose from unionization. And by
317
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extension, those employers will therefore put on the fiercest campaign.
However, the employees of such employers arguably have the least need
to get negative information about the union, since the union would be
likely to help them.320
The converse is also true. In those situations where the union is least
likely to help employees – namely, where the union will not be all that
effective in improving terms and conditions – the employer has the least
incentive to wage a vigorous campaign. These incentives are most
skewed when the union has favorable relations with the employer.
Obviously, an employer will not disseminate negative information about
an employer-dominated union. But such unions are illegal under the
NLRA, and the Board would have the power to disempower such a union
were employees to complain.321 However, other unions exist which are
known to be more friendly to employers, and more apt to agree to
favorable contracts, but their activities may not cross the line into illegal
collusion. The existence of so-called “sweetheart” unions is an
understudied but undeniable part of the union landscape.322 Employers
have no incentives to campaign against such unions. In fact, an employer
has strong incentives to court such unions, especially if there is a
possibility of a good-faith union drive down the road. As will be
discussed below, with a sweetheart union an employer could lock its
employees into a collective bargaining agreement for three years. Thus,
incentives for the employer to provide negative information about the
union will be the lowest when structurally the need for such information
will be the highest.
Of course, if more than one union is seeking to represent a group of
employees, the unions will provide negative information about each
other. But such elections are comparatively rare. In 2004, the NLRB
handled 2,565 elections involving only one union, and 154 elections

320

In saying this I recognize that there still is a need for negative information about the
union, even if the employer has a lot to lose from unionization. The union could still be
corrupt or ineffective. My point is that, holding union effectiveness constant, employers
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(due to employer concessions) increase.
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involving more than one union.323 Much of this is a result of AFL-CIO
guidelines restricting member unions from competing against each other.
Under Article XX of the AFL-CIO Constitution, member unions are not
permitted to organize or attempt to represent employees that are already
represented by another AFL-CIO union.324 In addition, member unions
cannot disseminate information as part of an organization campaign that
may “adversely affect” the reputation of another member union.325 These
restrictions provide AFL-CIO monopolies over certain groups of
employees. In so doing, they also restrict the information available to
employees about the union.
Markets depend in large part on competition within the market to
provide the necessary information about the quality of goods and
services. Advertising is often centered around a comparison between one
product and another, attempting to show why the advertised product is
superior. In addition, sellers have incentives to provide information
based on market pressure from other competitors. If other firms are
revealing information about their product that consumers find useful,
even if that information is mixed, an individual firm will be punished by
consumers if it does not provide comparable information. If there is only
one firm in the market, however, that firm will have much greater
leverage in setting consumer expectations about the level of information
disclosure.
Thus, the union representation election often provides improper
incentives for the provision of material information to employees. The
union has incentive to provide positive information about itself and
negative information about the employer. The Board’s campaign model
thus depends on the employer to provide positive information about itself
and negative information about the union. However, the employer’s
incentives will be weakest in those situations where employees most need
to receive negative information about the union – namely, when the union
is looking for a sweetheart deal. Given these incentives, employees may
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National Labor Relations Board, Sixty-Ninth Annual Report 16 (2005), available at:
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not get information about a less-than-zealous union until it is too late –
namely, until after they have been locked into a three-year contract.326
3. The market for union representation does not have a vigorous role for
reputational intermediaries.
One argument against mandatory disclosure in the context of the
securities markets is cites to the protection provided to the market by
“reputational intermediaries.” 327 Although mandatory disclosure critics
recognize that firms may have inadequate incentives to disclosure
information, they argue that the demand for information will create a
market for that information.328 If sellers need to provide information in
order to sell their product, they will provide the information; the market,
through interactions between sellers and buyers, is best equipped to
determine what information is necessary to disclose.329 While
acknowledging that information about securities may be more difficult to
verify, critics of mandatory disclosure argue that securities are not unique
in this regard. According to one set of commentators, the “lemons”
argument proves too much, as it is also hard to verify claims about the
efficacy of toothpaste or the pricing of funeral services.330 So without
mandatory disclosure, the securities markets would not dry up; instead,
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issuers would use the same tools as other sellers to market their wares to
investors.331
How would this happen? Issuers would voluntarily disclose all of the
information that investors would need in order to buy the stock at a
proper price. If a company refused to disclose, investors would be
justifiably wary, and the prices for their securities would drop
precipitously.332 However, Akerlof’s “market for lemons” thesis assumes
that the information about the product is hard to verify. If there is no
system in place for mandatory disclosure and governmental penalties for
failing to do so, then investors may be concerned about the quality of the
information they receive. And Akerlof’s downward spiral could kick in.
Rather than relying on the threat of government enforcement to assure the
quality of information disclosed, issuers would have to find a private way
to assure investors of information quality.333 This is where reputational
intermediaries come in. These market players would sell their reputations
as honest, impartial, and savvy investigators to investors as a means of
checking against issuer fraud. Even with our system of mandatory
disclosure, our securities market still places vital tasks in the hands of
reputational intermediaries. Accounting firms provide independent audits
of the firm’s financial health. Investment banks provide further
verification by acting as underwriters and thus vouching for the security.
Attorneys comb through the issuer’s disclosures to make sure they
comply with the relevant law. And research analysts pore over the
disclosures and then report their impressions to clients, financial media
outlets, and eventually the investing public.
There is no denying the importance of reputational intermediaries, or
“gatekeepers,”334 to the proper functioning of the securities markets. The
failures of the 2001-2002 corporate scandals were often put at the feet of
331

See Nicholas L. Georgakopoulos, Why Should Disclosure Rules Subsidize Informed
Traders?, 16 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 417, 418-19 (1996) (using the Coase theorem to
argue that investors will bargain for the appropriate level of fraud-prevention measures).
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information).
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reputational intermediaries,335 and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002
endeavors to shore up the ability of accountants and lawyers to serve as
informational gatekeepers.336 However, much of the current “reputational
intermediaries” system depends on the law to require or reinforce the
provision of those services. For example, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
imposed rigorous independence requirements on accountants and created
a new independent oversight board to maintain accounting standards.337
The market did not require these of accountants prior to Sarbanes-Oxley,
and yet they are perhaps the least controversial aspects of the new law.338
Attorneys generally act as intermediaries with respect to legal mandates,
including disclosure requirements. In the absence of those mandates,
attorneys would only be responsible for insuring compliance with private
contracts. The stock exchanges are given special privileges and
responsibilities by the SEC as self-regulating organizations.339 In his
blueprint for a strong securities market, Black notes that such a market
needs not only reputational intermediaries but also laws regulating these
intermediaries. For example, one of Black’s eighteen requirements340 for
controlling informational asymmetry is “[a] sophisticated accounting
profession, with the skill and experience to catch at least some instances
of false or misleading disclosure.”341 However, Black also requires “laws
that impose on accountants enough risk of liability to investors . . . so that
the accountants will resist their clients’ pressure for laxer audits or more
favorable disclosure.”342
335
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Union financial disclosure is governed by the Labor-Management
Reporting and Disclosure Act, also known as the Landrum-Griffin Act.343
The Department of Labor implements the LMRDA’s requirements
through regulations;344 these regulations were recently modified to
require a greater amount of disclosure.345 However, the new regulations
have been criticized for not requiring unions to employ independent or
outside auditors.346 By allowing unions to rely on their own employees to
report sensitive financial data, the LMRDA’s regulations do not require
the additional set of independent eyes to verify the veracity of that data.
Although some large unions do use outside auditors in managing their
finances, outside auditors are a general regulatory requirement for
publicly-traded companies.347
Of course, LMRDA disclosure is designed for those who have already
joined the union. An employer may use the union’s disclosures for its
own campaign purposes, often using the photocopy of the Department of
Labor’s form to prove its veracity.348 But there is no requirement that
employees receive what the union discloses to the LMRDA during the
course of a union representation campaign. They may not even know of
superficial in its audits, or that a stock exchange fails to require the proper
documentation for acceptance. But just as there can be a “lemons” market for securities,
there can be a “lemons” market for those who vouch for securities. Investors cannot
know precisely how well their reputational intermediaries are doing their jobs.
However, slightly more forgiving accountants will be desirable to issuers, who will be
looking for reputational intermediaries to put them in the best light. Thus, market forces
will drive accountants to be less strict, leading to less confidence from investors in their
results. As Black notes: “The result is ironic: The principal role of reputational
intermediaries is to vouch for disclosure quality and thereby reduce information
asymmetry in securities markets. But information asymmetry in the market for
reputational intermediaries limits their ability to play this role.” Id. at 788.
343
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344
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its existence. The NLRB is an independent agency, as distinct from the
Department of Labor, which is an executive branch agency.349
Employees in the midst of a representation campaign may not know that
there is information available that might be useful to their representation
decision until after they are already in the organization.350
In addition, there is not the vibrant financial and consumer media that
exists for other products and services. According to Black, another
critical institution for a vibrant securities market is “[a]n active financial
press and securities analysis profession that can uncover and publicize
misleading disclosure and criticize company insiders and (when
appropriate) investment bankers, accountants, and lawyers.”351 As Black
noted:
Reputation markets require a mechanism for distributing
information about the performance of companies, insiders,
and reputational intermediaries. Disclosure rules help, as do
reputational intermediaries' incentives to advertise their
successes. But intermediaries won't publicize their own
failures, and investors will discount competitors'
complaints because they come from a biased source. An
active financial press is an important source of reporting of
disclosure failures.352
The press does cover union failures and scandals, and such information is
obviously relevant to the union representation decision. However, there
is not the same level of coverage or sophistication that is applied to
information about the securities markets. Nor is there the same sort of
attention that is given to consumer products through such organizations as
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Consumer Reports.353 There is no “Consumer Reports for Unions.” For
a variety of reasons, it seems unlikely that reputational intermediaries
such as “union analysts” will emerge any time soon. As AFL-CIO unions
do not compete against one another, employees looking for AFL-CIO
representation only have one choice. Unlike securities, union
representation is not sold on a fungible national market. Thus, there is
not the money to be made on selling information about unions on a
national scale. Additionally, potential union members would not be in a
position to pay significant sums for the kind of serious analysis that stock
investors enjoy. And if they were, they still might not choose to do so
given the free-rider problems inherent in obtaining the information. The
information would benefit all potential employees at the firm. In fact, the
purchaser would have an incentive to share it, as the purchaser still needs
a majority of employees to agree with her if she wishes to prevail on the
representation question. But while the benefits will accrue to all, it may
not be possible to get all to agree to share in the costs. Given the freerider concerns, information that would be efficient for all to obtain might
not be efficient for only one to obtain.
In sum, the role of reputational intermediaries in supplying
information to other markets is not replicated in the union representation
market. Their absence is yet another reason for concern about the
information employees receive.
4. The market for union representation does not have an easy exit once
consumers have made their purchase.
A corporate shareholder traditionally has two options if unsatisfied
with the direction of the company. The shareholder can either vote for
new directors or sell the shares to someone else. The alienability of
shares is a critical part of bundle of shareholder rights.354 Unlike
partnerships, corporations allow investors to sell their interests in the firm
without the need for unanimous approval or dissolution.355 And publicly353
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traded companies are treated quite differently than closely held
corporations because of the ease of exit. The ability to get out of the
investment gives shareholders an escape hatch in case they become
dissatisfied down the road.
In the market for union representation, the consequences of buying
into the union are quite different. The most obvious difference is that the
purchase of a stock gives the buyer something to resell, while a purchaser
of services generally can only stop buying the services. In that sense, exit
may be easier for the purchaser of services, because there is no need to
find someone else to buy it from you. However, service contracts can
have lengthy time periods, in which exit prior to the specified close can
be quite expensive.
When a majority of employees vote in favor of a particular union
during a representation election, they are choosing that union to represent
them in collective bargaining. Once selected, the union serves as that
representative indefinitely. In order to stop buying the union’s services,
employees must vote in a decertification election.356 As in the
representation election, a decertification election will only be conducted
if the petitioner can show that at least thirty percent of the employees in
the bargaining unit are in favor of such an election.357 The NLRB then
conducts a secret ballot election and decertifies the union if supported by
a majority of the votes.
The decertification process is not easy; it takes time to collect
signatures for the petition, hold the actual election, and then resolve any
disputes over pre-election conduct. However, the statute also provides
that no election can be held within a year after an election has been
held.358 In the representation context, the Board has extended this ban
until a year after it has actually certified the union as bargaining
representative.359 The Board will consider any decertification petition
filed within a year of certification to be untimely.360 Thus, the contract
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for union services has at a de jure one-year minimum term from the
start.361
If the union and the employer agree to a contract, the Board imposes
an additional “contract bar” on potential decertification elections. Under
the contract-bar doctrine, employees are prohibited from filing a
decertification petition during the life of a negotiated collective
bargaining agreement.362 Thus, once the union and employer have agreed
to terms, the employees must retain the union for the life of the contract.
The contract bar lasts a maximum of three years, even if the agreement
goes beyond that.363 However, the agreement need not be ratified by
members in order to have preclusive effect, unless the agreement by its
terms requires such approval.364
Of course, if the union and employer keep negotiating agreements,
making sure to have a new contract before the other one expires, the
employees would never have an opportunity to decertify the union. Thus,
the Board has created a thirty-day window in which decertification
petitions may be filed. The Board will consider a petition timely filed if it
is filed no more than ninety days, but no less than sixty days, before the
expiration of the agreement.365 The Board created the sixty-day cutoff in
order to give the union a period of negotiation “free from the threat of
overhanging rivalry and uncertainty.”366 Although there are some
exceptions to the contract-bar doctrine, they generally involve an illegal
clause in the contract367 or union incapacity through schism or
defunctness.368
The one-year and contract-bar rules are most dangerous when there is
collusion between the employer and the union. Under such circumstances
the employer and the union can agree to a contract and prevent the
361

Since it will take some time between the filing of the petition and the decertification
election, the bar is actually longer than a year. Employers are not allowed to withdraw
recognition after a year based on a decertification petition presented to the employer
before the year’s end. Id.
362
See Cind-R-Lite Co., 239 NLRB 1255 (1979).
363
General Cable Corp., 139 NLRB 1123 (1962).
364
See Stur-Dee Health Prods., 248 NLRB 1100 (1980); Appalachian Shale Prod. Co.,
121 NLRB 1160 (1958).
365
See Leonard Wholesale Meats Co., 136 NLRB 1000 (1962).
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Deluxe Metal Furniture Co., 121 NLRB 995, 1001 (1958) (quotations omitted).
367
See Hardin & Higgins, supra note HH1, at 527-29.
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See id. at 535-38.
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employees from voting out the union for up to three years.369 However,
even when a union is merely incompetent, employees may still be stuck
with a poor bargaining representative for a lengthy period of time.
The Board does allow an alternative to decertification for removing a
union from representation. An employer may refuse to bargain with a
union if the union has in fact lost the support of a majority of the
employees.370 This standard replaced the old rule which permitted
employers to cease negotiating based on a “good faith reasonable doubt”
that the union had continuing majority support.371 Under the new
standard, an employer may cease to negotiate with the union if it can
prove that the union no longer enjoys majority support. In order to allow
for employers to determine this in the face of questions about union
support, the Board allows for the employer to petition for a decertification
election based on “good faith reasonable uncertainty” about the
continuing majority status.372 However, an employer is allowed to poll its
employees if it has good faith reasonable doubt about continuing majority
status.373 Thus, doubt is enough to enable the employer to poll, and the
poll may provide the employer with evidence that the union no longer
enjoys majority support.374 In the alternative, uncertainty – as evidenced
by employee dissatisfaction – will be sufficient to allow an employer to
call an election as to the union’s continued support.375
There are substantial policy reasons for making it difficult for
employees to decertify a union. However, such difficulties also impose a
cost. Because of the difficulties of exit, there is a higher premium placed
on employees’ ability to make the correct decision at the beginning.
5. The NLRB does not police misrepresentations in the union
representation campaign.
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See G. Robert Blakey & Ronald Goldstock, "On the Waterfront": RICO and Labor
Racketeering, 17 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 341, 344 (1980) (recognizing that the contract-bar
rule allows the employer and union to benefit from a "sweetheart" contract).
370
Levitz Furniture of the Pacific, 333 NLRB 717, 717 (2001).
371
See Allentown Mack Sales & Services v. NLRB, 522 U.S. 359 (1998).
372
Levitz, 333 NLRB at 717, 723.
373
Id. at 723.
374
In an unfair labor practice hearing, the employer would bear the burden of proving
actual loss of majority support. Id. at 725.
375
See id. at 728-29.
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As discussed previously,376 the Board has held that misrepresentations
do not violate the Board’s “laboratory conditions” as longs as such
misrepresentations are not akin to forgery.377 In summarizing the
rationale for its policy, the Board stated:
In addition to finding [a more restrictive] rule to be
unwieldy and counterproductive, we also consider it to
have an unrealistic view of the ability of voters to assess
misleading campaign propaganda. As is clear from an
examination of our treatment of misrepresentations under
the Wagner Act, the Board had long viewed employees as
aware that parties to a campaign are seeking to achieve
certain results and to promote their own goals. Employees,
knowing these interests, could not help but greet the
various claims made during a campaign with natural
skepticism. The "protectionism" propounded by the [the
earlier] rule is simply not warranted. On the contrary, as we
found in Shopping Kart, "we believe that Board rules in
this area must be based on a view of employees as mature
individuals who are capable of recognizing campaign
propaganda for what it is and discounting it."378
If, as Craig Becker has noted, the representation election is akin to a
political campaign,379 a hands-off policy towards the hurly-burly world of
campaigning might be an appropriate one.380 However, such a stance is
anathema in the world of contracts, where fraud is universally prohibited.
Common law fraud prohibits deception that leads to reliance, and in some
circumstances even a failure to disclose can constitute deception.
However, many contractual regulatory schemes have developed stricter
prohibitions against misrepresentations. In the securities context, for
example, federal securities law have several express and implied causes
376

See supra Part I.B.4.
Midland Nat’l Life Ins. Co., 263 NLRB 127, 131-32 (1982).
378
Id. at 132 (quoting Shopping Kart Food Market, Inc., 228 NLRB 1311, 1313 (1978)).
379
See Becker, supra note CB1.
380
See Evan Richman, Note, Deception in Political Advertising: The Clash Between the
First Amendment and Defamation Law, 16 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 667, 670 (1998)
(noting the lack of regulation for misrepresentations in the political arena).
377
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of actions against misrepresentations.381 Perhaps the most important
antifraud provision is Rule 10b-5, which prohibits misrepresentations or
misleading omissions in the context of the purchase or sale of a
security.382 Rule 10b-5 offers substantially more protection against
misrepresentations than traditional common law fraud.383 There has been
little controversy about Rule 10b-5 basic mission: to eliminate
misrepresentations and misleading omissions in the market for
securities.384
Thus, unlike pretty much any other product market, there is no check
against fraud in the market for union representation services, except in the
very narrowest of circumstances. This failure to police against fraud is
yet another reason for concern about the quality of information available
to employees.
6. Market failures contribute to a lack of public confidence in the market
for union representation.
The percentage of private employees represented by unions has
steadily declined from the 1950s up until this year.385 These declines
come in the face of polls showing overall public support for unions. For
example, recent polls show that a majority of the public approve of labor
381

In addition to Rule 10b-5, which prohibits misrepresentations or omissions in
connection with the purchase or sale of a security, § 11(a) of the Securities Act, see 15
U.S.C. § 77k(a) (2000), prohibits a false statement of a material fact in a registration
statement, and § 12(a)(2) of the Act, see id. § 77l(a)(2), imposes liability for a false
statement of material fact in a prospectus.
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17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2006).
383
See Matthew T. Bodie, Aligning Incentives with Equity: Employee Stock Options and
Rule 10b-5, 88 IOWA L. REV. 539, 595-96 (2003).
384
Commentators on both sides of the mandatory disclosure debate agree that securities
markets need strong antifraud protection. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS OF LAW 486-89 (5th ed. 1998) (arguing that many aspects of securities
regulation may impede the flow of information to investors, but noting that investors
should be protected from fraud); Alan R. Palmiter, Toward Disclosure Choice in
Securities Offerings, 1999 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 1, 130 ("A critical adjunct to my
proposal of disclosure choice is that issuers in public offerings would be subject to a
mandatory antifraud standard--namely, Rule 10b-5 liability."). Cf. Macey & Miller,
supra note MM1, at 390 ("The social value of preventing fraud in the sale of securities is
too clear to require elaboration.").
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Bureau of Labor Statistics, Union Members Summary, January 20, 2006, available
at: http://www.bls.gov/news.release/union2.nr0.htm.

69

INFORMATION & REPRESENTATION ELECTIONS

unions and believe that unions are good for the economy.386 However,
there is some evidence of concerns about union competence. According
to one poll, 71 percent agreed that the government ought to do more to
protect union members from corrupt union officials.387 Certainly, images
of union corruption have inundated the public since the 1950s. The 19571958 Senate hearings on union corruption, chaired by Senator John
McClellan and staffed by Robert Kennedy, brought to light many
instances of union corruption, including ties with organized crime.388
Episodes of malfeasance by union officials continue. Congress, courts,
and commentators have struggled with the best methods of curtail such
corruption and have resorted to such extraordinary measures as forced
judicial trusteeships with no set time limits.389 While the federal
government has had significant success in removing organized crime
from certain unions,390 the shadow remains. And in the popular media,
shows such as “The Sopranos” portray unions as mere vessels for mafia
control of certain industries.391
In the capital markets, mandatory disclosure has been called upon to
shore up public confidence in securities. The need for public confidence
was touted as a key purpose for the New Deal securities legislation392 and
has been cited repeatedly as justification for further mandatory
386

See, e.g., Heather Mason Kiefer, Public Remains Positive About Labor Unions,
Sept.13, 2005, available at: http://poll.gallup.com/content/default.aspx?ci=12751
(showing that 58% approve of labor unions and 54% believe that unions are good for the
U.S. economy); John Zogby et al., Nationwide Attitudes Toward Unions, Feb. 26, 2004,
available at: http://psrf.org/info/Nationwide_Attitudes_Toward_Unions_2004.pdf
(public poll finding that 63 percent approve of labor unions).
387
Zogby et al., supra note JZ1, at 15.
388
Michael J. Nelson, Note, Slowing Union Corruption: Reforming the Landrum-Griffin
Act to Better Combat Union Embezzlement, 8 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 527, 532-37 (2000).
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For an in-depth discussion of two such trusteeships, see Clyde W. Summers, Union
Trusteeships and Union Democracy, 24 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 689 (1991)
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Jim Jacobs has discussed the federal government’s role in eliminating mob influence
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James B. Jacobs & Ellen Peters, Labor Racketeering: The Mafia and the Unions, 30
CRIME & JUST. 229 (2003).
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disclosure.393 The Sarbanes-Oxley Act was perhaps in large part an effort
to restore investor confidence after the shocks of 2001 and 2002.394
Although some commentators have criticized the lack of empirical
support for this justification,395 there is no question that market
confidence encourages investment in equities.396 In fact, the system of
public securities regulation could be considered a government subsidy to
investors and issuers. By taking steps to insure the integrity of the
markets, the government saves investors and issuers enforcement costs
that they would otherwise bear. Our securities market would not be as
strong without this system of public intervention.397
One purpose of mandatory disclosure is to make fraud more difficult.
Passed in the midst of the bust following the boom of the 1920s, the New
Deal securities acts aimed at eliminating fraud through greater disclosure
and penalties for noncompliance. Required disclosure was seen as a way
of bringing more “sunlight,” in Brandeis’ famous phrase, into the inner
workings of corporate shares.398 Preventing fraud was only one end of
the spectrum, however. On the other end, proponents and enforcers of the
New Deal acts hoped that the outflow of information would lead to better
pricing and trading on the markets. The Acts, particularly the 1933 Act,
were seen as a way of making sure the securities markets acted rationally.
In a 1933 article supporting the legislation, William O. Douglas and
George E. Bates wrote that the effects of the 1933 Act would be: “(1)
prevention of excesses and fraudulent transactions, which will be
hampered and deterred merely by the requirement that their deals be
revealed; and (2) placing in the market during the early stages of the life
of a security a body of facts which, operating indirectly through
393

Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note EF1, at 692 (“The justification most commonly
offered for mandatory disclosure rules is that they are necessary to ‘preserve confidence’
in the capital markets.”).
394
Troy A. Paredes, Blinded by the Light: Information Overload and Its Consequences
for Securities Regulation, 81 WASH. U. L.Q. 417 (2003) (stating that the August 2002
financial statement certifications required under Sarbanes-Oxley helped convince
investors that firms as a whole were not dishonest or poorly-run).
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Id. at 693.
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See Black, supra note BB1, at 782-85.
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See LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE’S MONEY AND HOW BANKERS USE IT 92
(1914) (“Publicity is justly commended as a remedy for social and industrial diseases.
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investment services and expert investors, will tend to produce more
accurate appraisal of the worth of the security . . . .”399 Echoing the
thoughts of Douglas and Bates, the SEC later explained the purpose of the
1933 Act as twofold:
The Securities Act, often referred to as the ‘truth in
securities’ Act, was designed not only to provide investors
with adequate information upon which to base their
decisions to buy and sell securities, but also to protect
legitimate business seeking to obtain capital through honest
protestation against competition from crooked promoters . .
. .400
Mandatory disclosure will not prevent fraud; the securities markets
amply demonstrate that. But mandatory disclosure creates a market
environment that is richer in information and less susceptible to breed the
most overt kinds of fraud. Such an environment will help boost public
confidence in the market itself. Just as mandatory disclosure has been
employed to improve public confidence in the securities markets, it may
be useful in boosting public confidence in the market for union
representation.
PART IV: DISCLOSURE UNDER THE LABOR-MANAGEMENT REPORTING
AND DISCLOSURE ACT
Although a regime of information disclosure would be new for the
union representation campaign, it would not be for unions themselves.
The National Labor Relations Board regulates the relationship between
union and employers and creates the regulatory regime for the initial
choice by employees whether or not to join a union. The Department of
399

William O. Douglas & George E. Bates, The Federal Securities Act of 1933, 43 YALE
L.J. 171, 172 (1933).
400
10 S.E.C. Ann. Rep. 14 (1944). See also Securities and Exchange Commission, The
Work of the Securities and Exchange Commission 1 (1967) (stating that the New Deal
Acts require disclosure so that “investors may make a realistic appraisal of the merits of
securities and thus exercise an informed judgment in determining whether to purchase
them”), quoted in George J. Bentson, The Effectiveness and Effects of the SEC’s
Accounting Disclosure Requirements, in ECONOMIC POLICY AND THE REGULATION OF
CORPORATE SECURITIES 23, 24 (Henry G. Manne, ed. 1969).
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Labor oversees the management and organization of the union itself,
including internal union elections and a union’s relationship with its
members. While the NLRB may not require disclosure in the
representation election context, the Department of Labor requires unions
to provide extensive disclosure to their members. 401 This disclosure is
provided for by the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act
(LMRDA or Landrum-Griffin Act), and covers much of the union’s
internal governance and finances. Thus, a system of mandatory
disclosure in the representation context could piggyback off the existing
LMRDA system, if there is overlap between the two sets of disclosures.
Labor organization disclosures are set forth in Title II of the LMRDA.
Section 201(a) of the Act requires unions to provide the Department of
Labor with a copy of its constitution and bylaws.402 In addition, the union
is required to file a report providing the names and titles of union officers,
the union’s dues and fees structure, and detailed statements about the
union’s procedures for such matters as qualifications for or restrictions on
membership, authorization for disbursement of funds, audit of financial
transactions of the labor organization, the calling of regular and special
meetings, the selection of officers and stewards, imposition of fines,
suspensions, and expulsions of members, authorization for bargaining
demands, ratification of contract terms, and authorization for strikes.403
Section 201(b) of the Act requires that unions file annual reports, signed
by the president and treasurer, disclosing details about the union’s
401

In many ways, the split between the two systems resembles the split in regulation of
the sale of securities. The federal system of required disclosure for the sale of corporate
securities proceeds largely in two steps. First, before a firm decides to offer a security
for sale, it must proffer extensive information about itself, its finances, its prospects, the
expected price, and other information deemed relevant to potential buyers. Second, once
the security has been sold to initial buyers and thereafter is traded on the public markets,
firms have a continuing obligation to disclose relevant financial information, insider
transactions, executive compensation, and other matters relevant to the security’s value.
Each step is established largely by one of the New Deal securities acts: the Securities
Act of 1933 is primarily about initial disclosure, while the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 primarily concerns the trading of securities on public markets. THOMAS L. HAZEN,
TREATISE ON THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION [ch. 1] (4th ed. 2002). In this
respect, as in the market for union representation, there are two disclosure paradigms:
one for the initial “purchase” and one for “members” after purchase.
402
29 U.S.C. § 431(a) (2000).
403
Id.
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financial condition and operations.404 Specifically, the Act requires
disclosure of assets and liabilities, receipts during the year and sources for
the receipts, salaries and other disbursements for all officers and
employees making more than $10,000, loans of more than $250 to
officers and employees, all loans to business enterprises, and “other
disbursements made by [the union].”405 The Secretary of the Department
of Labor is given authority to prescribe the rules and regulations for filing
the annual reports.406
Since 1960 the Department of Labor has provided forms through
which unions meet the disclosure requirements under Landrum-Griffin.
Form LM-1 is the initial form that covers the requirements of § 201(a) of
the Act.407 Forms LM-2, LM-3, and LM-4 are the annual reports that
cover a union’s organizational and financial disclosure under LMRDA §
201(a) and (b). Form LM-2 is the form for largest unions; the amounts
changed over time, but recent 2003 amendments placed the threshold at
unions with receipts of $250,000 or more.408 The Department of Labor
estimates that while only twenty percent of unions meet this threshold,
these unions received about ninety-three percent of the total dollars
received annually by unions.409 Forms LM
- 3 and LM-4 are simplified
410
In 2003, the Department of Labor gave the
forms for smaller unions.
regulations their first significant overhaul in more than forty years. What
follows is a more detailed discussion of the disclosure requirements
provided for by the Department of Labor’s regulations.
A. Dues and Fees
The initial form requires that the union set forth its dues and fees
structure.411 All three forms provide for the disclosure of the dues and
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fees required by the union for members.412 The categories are: regular
dues and fees, initiation fees, transfer fees, and work permits.413
B. Organizational Structure
The union is required to disclose a number of facts about its
organizational structure. In its initial filing, the union is required to
provide a copy of its constitution and bylaws to the Department of
Labor.414 In conjunction with these governing documents, the union must
prepare a report citing to the page, section, and/or paragraph number of
the governing documents that cover certain procedures. As noted in the
discussion of LMRDA § 201(a), these procedures include qualifications
for or restrictions on membership, authorization for disbursement of
funds, audit of financial transactions of the labor organization, the calling
of regular and special meetings, the selection of officers and stewards,
imposition of fines, suspensions, and expulsions of members,
authorization for bargaining demands, ratification of contract terms, and
authorization for strikes.415 The initial report also requires the union to
list its officers, as well as the date of the next election.416 In its annual
financial report, the union is required to list all of its officers,417 the date
of its next election of officers,418 and the number of members it has.419
C. Financial Disclosure
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Form LM-2 Labor Organization Annual Report 2, available at:
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Prior to the 2003 changes to the regulations, the Department of
Labor asked unions to disclose their overall assets and liabilities, as well
as their general receipts and disbursements.420 Unions are now not only
required to list their general receipts and disbursements, but to itemize
them as well (for amounts greater than $5,000).421 Separate schedules
provide for the itemization of accounts receivable,422 loans receivable,423
investments and fixed assets,424 and other assets and liabilities.425 Unions
must also itemize individual receipts and disbursements made to support
particular union functions, such as contract negotiation and
administration, organizing, and political activities.426 In addition to these
itemizations, unions must also break down the time each officer or
employee spends on the various activities of the organization.427
D. Example: Local Union 1199, Service Employees International Union
Looking at an actual set of disclosures may assist in illuminating the
nature and extent of those disclosures. The 2004 LM-2 provided by
Local 1199 of the Service Employees International Union is one such
example;428 it is available online through a search of the Department of
Labor’s website.429 The 196-page document provides the annual
420

See Recent Regulation, supra note RR1, at 1735.
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disclosure for Local 1199, one of the largest and most successful unions
in the country.430 According to the 2004 form, Local 1199 has 240,000
members, roughly $60 million in assets, and roughly $15 million in
liabilities.431 Dues range from $13.00 to $75.00, with initiation fees
ranging from $75 to $200.432 The union received over $100 million in
dues, and total receipts were over $137 million. The LM-2 also provides
a breakdown of investments, fixed assets, other assets, sales and
purchases of investments and assets, and loans payable.433
The LM-2 also provides a list of all officers as well as their total
compensation. The form lists 131 officers who receive a total of over $5
million in total compensation.434 Union president Dennis Rivera received
$147,710 in total compensation for 2004.435 The next regular election of
officers is not until June 2007.436 The form also itemizes all
disbursements to employees; each employee is listed by name, title, and
total compensation.437 Finally, there are schedules for benefits,
contributions, gifts, and grants, office and administrative expenses, and
other receipts and disbursements.438
How much of this information would be useful for employees
contemplating joining SEIU? How likely are they to obtain it? If they
obtain it, how likely are they to read it? Below is an effort to begin
answering these questions.
PART V. A NEW MODEL FOR REPRESENTATION ELECTION REGULATION
The primary purpose of this paper is to begin the conversation about a
new model for regulating the union representation election. The current
system is a strange admixture of ambiguous and heavy-handed
requirements about what may be said combined with a completely handsoff approach to what must be said. As a result, unions and employers
430
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must step carefully during the campaign so as to avoid statements or
behavior that violate the Board’s “laboratory conditions” doctrine. At the
same time, the Board makes no effort to ensure that employees get the
information they need to make an economically rational decision, other
than to provide unions with the names and addresses of those workers
whom they are courting. The resulting system may be the worst of all
possible worlds.
In order to redesign the regulation surrounding the union
representation election, I propose three facets to a new regulatory model:
(a) required disclosure by unions, (b) required disclosure by employers if
they wish to participate in the campaign, and (c) a more hands-off
approach to regulation, except in the case of misrepresentation. These
three reforms are discussed in more detail below.
A. Required Union Disclosure
As discussed in Part IV, there is reason to believe that the union
representation election process suffers from informational failures.
Information is distributed asymmetrically, and unions and employers may
lack the proper incentives to insure that employees get the information
they need to make the decision. As in the securities regulation context, as
well as many other contractual contexts, a system of mandatory
information disclosure would be useful in ensuring that consumers get
relevant information.
What would such a system look like? My hope is that this article
will spur debate about exactly this question. But I would like to set forth
a few preliminary thoughts the content of the disclosure, as well as the
means of delivering that content to employees.
1. Content
What sorts of information are relevant and material to the union
representation question? The answer may vary by election, by individual,
and by time period. Further empirical research would be extremely
useful in determining exactly what workers want to know in making their
decision.439 The following categories serve as a starting point in
determining what data workers might want.
439

As discussed earlier, one empirical study discounted the importance of information
received by employees during the campaign. See GETMAN ET AL., supra note JG1, at
62-64 (finding employees generally voted as they thought they would before the
campaign), 76-80 (finding a low recognition rate for campaign issues), 140-43 (arguing
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(a) Dues and fees. Obviously, employees would want to know how
much their dues would be and what initiation fees would be required.
The LMRDA requires disclosure of union dues in both the union’s initial
filings and in its annual reports.440 As the Local 1199 SEIU example
demonstrates, however, the union may disclose a range of dues and fees,
rather than a specific amount. In such cases, employees would want to
know exactly how much the union is proposing to charge in their
particular case.
Employees may also want a sense of whether those dues are likely
to change in the next few years. Given the difficulties of exit, employees
are essentially signing up for a three-year contract when they agree to
union representation. Although unions may not know what their future
financial needs will be, they may have information about future dues
prices that would be useful to the employees’ decision. The union could
be required to disclose whether any dues or fees hikes are set to be voted
on by the members, or whether union officials have plans for such an
increase in the upcoming year.
(b) Organizational structure. Like any organization, potential
members generally would want to know how the union is structured and
what its policies are for members. The union must disclose its
constitution and bylaws under the LMRDA. Form LM-1 asks the union
to list such information as qualifications for or restrictions on
membership, authorization for disbursement of funds, the types of audits
the labor organization undergoes, the calling of regular and special
meetings, the selection of officers and stewards, the circumstances under
which fines, suspensions, or expulsions can be imposed, and the
requirements for authorizing bargaining demands, contract terms, and
strikes.441 In addition, members may want to know who the union
officials are, their backgrounds, and perhaps even their salaries.442 Form
that hands-off regulation is proper, given the lack of importance to the campaign itself).
However, as noted, critics have charged that the data did not support the authors’
normative claims. See supra text accompanying notes XXX-YYY. In addition, the
study was focused on whether the campaign affected workers’ attitudes, not whether
workers were getting the information they needed to make economically rational
decisions.
440
Form LM-1, supra note LM1; Form LM-2, supra note LM2.
441
Id.
442
The question of salaries is likely to provoke some controversy. On the one hand,
corporations are required to disclose salary information under federal securities law on
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LM-2 requires the disclosure of officials and disbursements to officials.
Officials could also be required to provide a short biography that included
certain specific facts, such as education, work experience, criminal
record, and time with the union.
(c) Nature and Quality of Services. Perhaps the most important set of
information for employees would concern the nature and quality of the
representation services provided by the union. As noted earlier,443 there
is a distinct information asymmetry with respect to information about the
union’s services. Employees who have never belonged to the union do
not know how well the union will do in negotiating new terms, avoiding
strikes, managing grievances, and keeping dues low. When buying a
product, consumers can often see and handle the product, and they are
often given the right to return the product if they find it unsatisfactory.
Home buyers hire inspectors, tour the home, and still benefit from
mandatory disclosure requirements on the part of the seller. But union
consumers have a much tougher time predicting how effective the union
will be in providing services.
There may be ways to get information about performance to
employees making a representation decision. The union’s past and
current collective bargaining agreements provide concrete facts about the
terms and conditions the union has negotiated for other employees.
Having access to these contracts would provide a way for workers to
comparison-shop. A more speculative form of information would be
union predictions about what they expect to negotiate with the employer.
The union might present information about what its initial demands
would be, and it could even provide information about what it expects to
get. It could even disclose the risks that the union will not be able to
the theory that shareholders should know what their agents are making. See 17 C.F.R. §
229.402 (2006); cf. SEC Release Nos. 33-8655, 34-53185 (January 27, 2006), available
at: http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/33-8655.pdf (proposing new rules for executive
compensation disclosure). Given that union members have some of the same agency
costs concerns that shareholders do, compensation information may be material. See
Schwab, supra note SS1, at 377-83. However, the purchasers oif services generally do
not have the right to see the executive compensation for the company from whom they
are buying the services. To the extent that employees are simply consumers of union
representation services, such information could be much less relevant in comparison to
the quality of the services. Cf. Estreicher, supra note SE1, at 516-17 (arguing that forprofit unions should be allowed to provide union representation services).
443
See supra Part III.B.1.
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negotiate a contract, or the risk that the union will call the employees out
on strike at the risk of permanent replacement.
In the world of securities regulation, firms making an initial public
offering are required to disclose reams of financial information about
itself.444 Companies are even expected to make predictions about what
future events may damages their prospects of being successful in
business.445 One could envision a disclosure statement in which unions
provided a richer vision of what they expected to achieve and the
difficulties they contemplated facing as part of a mandatory disclosure
statement. Of course, unions would generally endeavor to be a nonspecific as possible, in order to avoid recriminations or liability down the
road. Unions could also plausibly argue that such statements would
reveal too much of their strategies and would enable the employer to get
an advantage in bargaining. As we consider a mandatory disclosure
regime, the pros and cons of such “softer” statements should be
considered along side the disclosure of “harder” financial data.
(d) Conflicts of Interest. The corporate world places a premium on
disclosure whenever a potential conflict of interest arises between a
corporate officer and the corporation he or she serves.446 Employees are
entitled to know about any potential conflict of interest between the union
and the employer. Evidence of such a conflict would be any overlap
between union personnel and the employer’s personnel, including spouses
and other close relatives, or financial ties between the union and the
employer.447 Current or past collective bargaining relationships between
the union and the employer (or an associated company) might also be
grounds for a conflict of interest. Moreover, any contracts between the
employer and its affiliates and the union (or its affiliates) should also be
disclosed to employees. They key here would be to have a sweep broad
444

See supra text accompanying notes AAA-BBB.
See 17 C.F.R. § 229.303 (2006) (“Describe any known trends or uncertainties that
have had or that the registrant reasonably expects will have a material favorable or
unfavorable impact on net sales or revenues or income from continuing operations.”).
446
See, e.g., State ex rel. Hayes Oyster Co. v. Keypoint Oyster Co. 391 P.2d 979, 986
(Wash. 1964) (“A corporation cannot ratify the breach of fiduciary duties unless full and
complete disclosure of all facts and circumstances is made by the fiduciary and an
intentional relinquishment by the corporation of its rights.”).
447
Such ties could be quite attenuated. It would be important to identify all companies
in which the employer had a significant ownership stake and to include those companies
in any analysis.
445
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enough to encompass all of the potential conflicts. For example, Teri
Moore may be president of the United Forever Union (UFU) and may
negotiate a fairly employer-friendly contract with Blue Industries. If Teri
also is the treasurer for Americans United Union (AUU), and AUU is
seeking to represent employees of Aquamarine Industries, a subsidiary of
Blue Industries, then Aquamarine employees should be told about and
given access to the UFU contract with Blue. The regulations would have
to be written to prevent employers and unions from avoiding the
disclosure requirements simply by creating new corporations or labor
organizations.
2. Delivery
Given the plethora of potentially relevant information available to
disclose, the Board would have to determine the best method for selecting
the disclosure and then delivering it to employees. In terms of selecting
the information, the Board would face a difficult choice. On the one
hand, the Board would want to keep the information disclosure as concise
as possible, in order to make it more accessible to employees. Recent
concerns about “information overload” have led commentators to
reexamine the amount of required disclosure in the realm of securities.448
On the other hand, some employees might be willing to spend the extra
time to dig through a larger amount of disclosure and would find the extra
information useful or even critical in making their decision. Given that
union elections can be determined by one employees out of hundreds, it
may make sense to give the marginal employee as much information as
he or she desires.
Technology may provide the answer to this dilemma. The Board
could provide for the mandatory disclosure in two steps. The first step
would be a short form distributed to all employees with a few pieces of
critical information included. The second step would be an Internet
website that would provide access to all of the other information the
448

Paredes, supra note TP1, at 419. Paredes notes that if a rational actor is forced to
process too much data in making a cost-benefit analysis, the actor may adopt one of
several decisionmaking heuristics which do not always process the information in a
rational manner. Id. at 437-43. While acknowledging that most investors rely on expert
“filters” such as mutual funds, research analysts, and the business media in making
investment decisions, Paredes cites to evidence that these filters are themselves subject
to information overload. Id. at 452-59. While making no affirmative policy proposals,
Paredes counsels that “securities regulation needs to focus to a greater extent on the user
of information.” Id. at 485.
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Board required to be disclosed. In this manner, all employees would be
given a set of disclosure that many would be likely to read. At the same
time, the few more industrious employees would have channeled access
to important information that may take much longer to absorb.
The primary issue surrounding the first step would be determining the
exact scope of the information to be provided. While the Board would
want to gather more information and could even consider rulemaking on
this issue,449 commentators may want to focus on determining what sorts
of information employees most want and how to convey that information
most concisely. Union dues and fees applicable to the voting employees,
for example, could be specified briefly. Terms and conditions of
employment in the union’s other collective bargaining agreements could
not. To someextent, the Board might want to use the short form to tip off
employees about information they could get through the website.
However, for the most part the Board would want to keep the short form
as a simple summary of the most critical facts about the union and its
services.
The primary issues surrounding the second step would be the design
of the website, the costs in implementing the system, and the likelihood
that employees would benefit from the system. In terms of the design,
this again is an issue for future policy development by the Board. It
should be fairly straightforward, however, to design a standard page for
each election which would provide access to the additional sets of
information. The Department of Labor has brought its entire LMRDA
disclosure system online, making it fairly simple to link to the
Department of Labor’s website or even directly link to the particular
union’s disclosure within the Department’s database. 450 Other
documents, such as the union’s past and present collective bargaining
agreements, could be posted to the page as documents that could be
449

For a discussion of the Board’s antipathy towards rulemaking, see Joan Flynn, The
Costs and Benefits of “Hiding the Ball”: NLRB Policymaking and the Failure of
Judicial Review, 75 B.U. L. REV. 387 (1995).
450
See Final Regulations, 68 Fed. Reg. at X; Department of Labor, LMRDA Reporting
& Disclosure, at: http://www.dol.gov/esa/regs/compliance/olms/rrlo/lmrda.htm.
Interestingly, ERISA has a requirement that the Secretaries of Labor and the Treasury
work together when they are requesting similar information. 29 U.S.C. § 1204 (2000).
The NLRB could similarly work with other branches of the Department of Labor to
make sure that LMRDA-required information was provided to employees in the midst of
a union organizing drive.
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downloaded. Moreover, the page could also link to the union’s website in
order to provide access to information. In terms of costs, it is fairly
simple to create a webpage, and Board technicians could use the same
web design for each representation election. It would be far more simple
to post electronic versions of collective bargaining agreements on the
web, as opposed to photocopying these agreements and distributing them
to employees. Finally, there is some question as to whether employees
would use such a system. However, computer ownership and Internet use
continue to grow across the country.451 Many employees have access to
the Internet at work. As many other commentators have suggested, using
the web is a cost-effective, extremely accessible method of distributing
lots of information to a large number of employees.452 It can overcome
the Lechmere access problems that have made it difficult for information
to reach employees. Combining access to the union with access to
mandatory disclosure about the union would provide an ideal mix of
information to employees.
B. Employer Disclosure
This article has focused primarily on the need for employees to
get information about the union offering its services. Given that unions
are seeking to provide services on behalf of the employees, it makes sense
to focus on their dues, internal organization, quality of services and
potential conflicts of interest. However, employees also find information
about the employer relevant to their representation decision. Although
there is ample ground for further discussion and research, this article
proposes a system of employer disclosure in which employers would be
given an option. The employer could provide a set of mandatory
disclosures and then participate in the campaign, or the employer could
remain neutral and provide no disclosure. This option would provide
451

Recent polls have shown that 73 percent of Americans use the Internet. Lawrence
Rout, Broadband: Online Audience Grows--from Different Directions, WALL ST. J.,
Sept. 13, 2004, at R2.
452
See Martin H. Malin & Henry H. Perritt, Jr., The National Labor Relations Act in
Cyberspace: Union Organizing in Electronic Workplaces, 49 U. KAN. L. REV. 1 (2000);
Susan S. Robfogel, Electronic Communication and the NLRA: Union Access and
Employer Rights, 16 LAB. L.J. 231 (2000); Gwynne A. Wilcox, Section 7 Rights of
Employees and Union Access to Employees: Cyber Organizing, 16 LAB. L.J. 253 (2000);
Elena N. Broder, Note, (Net)Workers’ Rights: The NLRA and Employee Electronic
Communications, 105 YALE L. J. 1639 (1996); Wissinger, supra note MW1, at 347-48.
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employers with a choice. They could contest the union’s efforts by
putting their own cards on the table, or they could stay out of the process
entirely.
What kinds of information would the employer provide? Again,
further research is necessary to determine exactly what kinds of employer
information are relevant and important to making a rational union
representation election. Ties to the union are certainly relevant, and it
may make sense to impose a duty on the employer to make disclosures
about any potential conflicts of interest between itself and the union. The
company’s finances are also relevant, as its financial condition may
dictate what level of wages and benefits it could provide to employees.
Much of the information useful to potential shareholders would also be
useful to employees contemplating unionization (albeit perhaps for
different reasons). In this regard, the Board could piggyback off
disclosures made by publicly-traded companies to the SEC. Like the
Department of Labor’s web-based database of LMRDA disclosure, the
SEC maintains EDGAR, an electronic database of all public disclosure by
publicly-held companies. The Board could provide a link to the
employer’s disclosures through the election website, just as it would link
to union disclosures at the website as well.
This system of optional disclosure would have two policy effects.
The first effect would be to increase the availability and accessibility of
information about the employer to employees. The second effect would
be to put a premium on employer participation within the campaign. For
large publicly-held companies, the disclosure might only mean providing
another copy of information that is already publicly available. For
smaller, closely-held companies, however, the required disclosure would
pose a significant burden. Not only would the company have to collect
the information, it would also have to disclose much of the previouslyprivate inner workings of the business organization. Private companies
may be private in part to avoid the SEC’s mandatory disclosure
requirements.453 Avoiding such disclosure may be worth the costs of
remaining neutral in an NLRB election.
This effect raises the possibility of either de facto or de jure
exclusion of the employer from the representation campaign. It is now
the received wisdom of the labor relations academy that employers
453

COX & HAZEN, supra note CH1, at 644.
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effectively play on employees’ fears in conducting their antiunion
campaigns.454 The primary justification for employer involvement in the
union campaign is the employer’s role in providing negative information
about the union to employees.455 If mandatory union disclosure provides
much of the critical information that employers have traditionally
provided, then perhaps employers should be excluded from the campaign.
Such an exclusion, however, would have to overcome complicated free
speech and informational concerns.456 On the other hand, a system of
optional disclosure would put a price on participation – a price rationally
related to representation election regulation.
C. Reconfiguring Campaign Regulation
The Board’s regime of representation election regulation has long
been criticized for its indeterminate and hair-splitting standards.457 Since
the Board has not been all that concerned with managing the information
in the campaign, the proposed system of disclosure would not necessarily
affect the Board’s prohibitions on coercion, bribery, or inflammatory
appeals; such regimes could coexist. At the same time, a new disclosure
regime might provide an opportunity for the Board to reexamine the
current prohibitions and adopt a simpler, more streamlined system. If the
union and employer are providing critical information to the employees
up front, then perhaps employees will place less emphasis on the
information they learn from the participants during the campaign.
However, given the different purposes of much of the Board’s regulation,
454

See, e.g., Larry Cohen & Richard W. Hurd, Fear, Conflict and Union Organizing, in
ORGANIZING TO WIN: NEW RESEARCH ON UNION STRATEGIES 181, 181 (Kate
Bronfenbrenner et al. eds., 1998).
455
See supra Part II.C.
456
Section 8(c) of the NLRA, which was added by the Taft-Hartley amendments,
provides: “The expressing of any views, argument, or opinion, or the dissemination
thereof, whether in written, printed, graphic, or visual form, shall not constitute or be
evidence of an unfair labor practice under any of the provisions of this subchapter, if
such expression contains no threat of reprisal or force or promise of benefit.” 29 U.S.C.
§ 158(c) (2000). The Supreme Court has noted that § 8(c) “merely implements the First
Amendment.” NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 617 (1969). However, the
Board has held that since § 8(c) only applies to unfair labor practices, it can go beyond §
8(c) in regulating representation campaigns. See, e.g., General Shoe Corp., 77 NLRB
124, 127 (1948). Whether the First Amendment would prohibit complete employer
exclusion is an open question.
457
See supra Part II.A.
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perhaps there need not be any changes to the Board’s efforts to regulation
speech and conduct that has the tendency to coerce employees in the
exercise of their choice.
However, there is one reform that would substantially supplement and
strengthen the disclosure regime: penalties for misrepresentation and
fraud. Unlike perhaps every other regime of commercial regulation, the
Board’s regulation of the union representation election does not penalize
for fraud. This failure is anathema to the need for employees to trust the
information they are getting from unions and employers. Required
disclosures would be useless if there are no penalties for failures or
misrepresentations in those disclosures. The Board should, at the least,
treat material misrepresentations as grounds for overturning an election,
and it should treat any error or omission in the mandatory disclosure as
per se material. The Board could also consider stronger penalties such as
monetary damages or injunctive relief. In making a union representation
decision, employees should be protected against fraud as consumers
generally are when making economic decisions.458 The Board should not
tolerate fraud.
D. Intended Effects of the New Regime
In laying out a framework for reform, I wish to conclude by talking
about the two general goals of these reforms – two effects they should
endeavor to create. First, the disclosure regime should highlight many of
the more egregious conflicts of interest between labor organizations and
employers. If ties between the union and company are highlighted for
employees, employees will be in a much better position to police such
ties. Second, a more rational and organized system of information
regulation will help employees make more informed and rational
decisions. And to the extent that employees could better trust the
information they are getting, they may feel more comfortable to
committing themselves to union membership. Certainly, better
information could lead to the result that even fewer employees decide to
join unions. But whatever the result, a system of disclosure would
provide employees with the tools to better evaluate the decisions before
458

Kent Greenfield has criticized the lack of fraud protection for employees in the
context of the labor market. Kent Greenfield, The Unjustified Absence of Federal Fraud
Protection in the Labor Market, 107 YALE L.J. 715 (1997).
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them. In the long run, more rational decisions will mean more efficient
ones, which will ultimately leave society better off.
CONCLUSION
The Board, courts, and academic commentators have (with good
reason) focused on employer coercion and administrative delay as key
concerns in the regulation of the union representation election. However,
the critical role of information – information necessary to make an
efficient representation decision – has been neglected. This paper argues
for a new approach to representation elections: one that creates disclosure
requirements for both unions and employers, as well as one that
empowers the Board to manage the flow of information to employees. At
the least, this new approach will help prevent conflicts of interest that
despoil the relationship between a union and its members. However, such
a process may ultimately lead to a newly invigorated market for
representation driven by a wiser, more informed class of employees.
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